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Abstract 
 
This paper explores treatment effects in three different contexts: an extended school year 
pilot program in an urban school district, a library summer reading program serving twenty-one 
urban school districts, and states passing the Equal Rights Amendment during the 1970s and 
1980s. 
Estimates generated using two years of intervention data along with difference-in-
differences and nearest neighbor approaches show that a new extended school year (ESY) 
program in the North Kansas City School District (NKCS) improved mathematics MAP test 
scores in the 4th grade treatment group and mathematics as well as communication arts MAP test 
scores in the 3rd grade treatment group when compared to the corresponding control group by 
approximately .3 standard deviations.  This is a large and statistically significant effect and 
indicates that the ESY intervention is improving achievement for these groups.   
Summer learning loss has been well documented in the education literature.  One attempt 
at combating this learning loss has been through the contributions of public libraries and their 
associated summer programs. Assessing program impact is difficult because public libraries 
cross the boundaries of multiple school districts.  This study highlights a case study which 
outlines a data-driven, research method that can be used to measure program impact by linking 
incongruent sources of academic data. The paper discusses the challenges associated with 
working with data provided by multiple school districts and finds that participation in this 
particular summer reading program is associated with better outcomes for elementary school 
students.    
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The United States Constitution does not guarantee equal rights based on gender.  The 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), passed by Congress in 1972, was intended to remedy this 
situation, but only thirty-five of the requisite thirty-eight states passed the law before its 1982 
expiration.  Making this topic relevant for today, the ratification of an unrelated amendment 203 
years after its Congressional approval has given ERA supporters renewed hope of its eventual 
passage. In fact, in 2018 the ERA was passed by both Nevada and Illinois taking the total 
number of passing states to thirty-seven, just one state short of the number needed for 
ratification.  The state by state variation in terms of ERA ratification affords the opportunity to 
examine the labor market effects of this legislation. Because the existence of the gender wage 
gap has been well-established in the literature, the findings may be helpful in constructing policy 
interventions that can eliminate it.  In this study, we find that, relative to men and other women, 
white women in ERA states were more likely to enter the labor force, but non-white women 
were the beneficiaries of increased pay and hours of work.  
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Chapter 1:  An Evaluation of an Extended Elementary School Year Program in an Urban Setting 
Introduction 
The educational achievement gap perpetuates economic inequality. Compared with 
children from advantaged backgrounds, children from low-income families who receive free and 
reduced lunch, children of color, and English language learners are less likely to score as 
proficient in school assessments (Jencks and Phillips, 1998; Reardon, 2011), graduate from high 
school (Losen, 2004; Rumberger, 2011), and attend college (Bennett and Xie, 2003; Goldrick-
Rab and Pfeffer, 2009; Bailey and Dynarski, 2011). These differences were identified in the 
1960s (Coleman et al., 1966) but have remained largely intractable (Gamoran and Long, 2007). 
Recognizing inequality in their students’ outcomes, the North Kansas City Public School 
District (NKCS) extended the school year for two elementary schools in the district with the goal 
of narrowing the achievement gap. Beginning in the 2015-16 academic year, NKCS, a large 
urban district in the Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan area, added 31 days to the school 
calendar in two of the 21 elementary schools in the district. This Extended School Year (ESY) 
policy was enacted to reduce the underperformance of students in schools with high rates of 
poverty and high percentages of English language learners (ELL). These racially and ethnically 
diverse schools served 820 students and had over 75% of students enrolled in the free or reduced 
lunch program (FRL) in 2015, with 22% ELL students. The extended calendar will not be offset 
by shorter school days or more time on the same curriculum. To date, fewer than 150 elementary 
schools, primarily charter schools, have adopted an extended calendar (National Center on Time 
& Learning, 2014). The NKCS ESY policy provides a rare opportunity to learn how added 
instructional time will affect children and may potentially narrow the achievement gap.   This 
study examines whether the ESY policy implemented by NKCS improved achievement of 
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students in the treated schools relative to a control group of schools with students from similar 
SES backgrounds. 
Despite the interest in alternative school year and school day schedules, the research base 
for such innovations is thin. Theoretically, additional instructional time via ESY or Extended 
School Day (ESD) schedules should improve students’ achievement outcomes. The literature on 
summer learning loss and its solutions, on year-round schooling, and on extended learning time 
all address some aspects of our research, but the literature leaves important questions 
unanswered.  
Summer learning loss has been well documented in the literature, and the consensus is 
this loss is exacerbated for low-income and other disadvantaged children (Cooper et al., 1996; 
Alexander, Entwisle, and Olson, 2001). In the same vein, literature on summer interventions 
shows well-structured programs benefit low-income participants (Kim and Quinn, 2013). This 
suggests that the enrichment aspect of the NKCS ESY will benefit students in the treated 
schools.  
Year-round schooling is generally implemented by redistributing the existing number of 
instructional days (approximately 180) across the calendar, with short breaks several times per 
year. The literature suggests the alternative calendar alone does little to advance overall student 
achievement (McMillan, 2001; Crow and Johnson, 2010; Wu and Stone, 2010) and in some 
cases may actually result in lower test scores (Graves, 2011). Simply rearranging a fixed number 
of instructional days appears to have little academic benefit. We have identified no rigorous 
research on the impact of extended calendars in public schools. Thus, research questions remain 
about the impact of ESY policies, particularly related to low-income students in the public-
school context.  
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A review of the literature on extended learning time examines 27 ESD programs and 28 
ESY programs (Redd et al, 2012). Both types of programs increase the amount of classroom 
contact time. The authors point out that although there is there is suggestive evidence of positive 
impacts, methodological issues, particularly the lack of rigorous experimental or quasi-
experimental designs, prevent the evidence from being conclusive. A second review (Patall, 
Cooper, and Allen, 2010) focuses on 15 quantitative studies of expanded time schools (expanded 
day, year, or both). This review also concludes that the research design of the generally is weak, 
and the literature is limited to examining test score outcomes.  In contrast, a study by Angrist et 
al. (2012) featured an experimental research design.  They studied the outcomes of students 
chosen by lottery for charter schools with an ESY. In addition to ESY, the charter school 
curriculum emphasized math and reading skills, selective teacher training, and strict behavioral 
standards. The authors find positive achievement results in reading and math, with gains 
concentrated on special needs students for those who won the lottery of attending the charter 
school compared to non-winners in traditional schools. It is unclear, however, whether gains are 
due to ESY or to other innovations in the charter school setting. 
One way that some students are given the opportunity for extended instructional time in 
the U.S. is through the 21st Century Community Learning Centers.  James-Burdumy, et al (2005) 
randomly assigned elementary school students to these centers and found that compared to other 
students, the attendees were not more likely to show high academic achievement.   
While there is some evidence that extended learning time improves student outcomes, 
understanding the mechanism is an important goal of this research.  How does extended time 
affect what goes on in the classroom?  Case studies compiled by the National Center on Time 
and Learning provide insights into this important component of extended learning time.  Kaplan 
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and Chan (2011) find that extended school time has been used by schools to: a) optimize time for 
student learning and individualized instruction; b) reinforce core values and emphasize school 
and career readiness; and c) devote time to teacher improvement.  Similarly, Kaplan, Chan, 
Farbman, and Novoryta (2014) examine the effect of expanded time on teacher collaboration and 
other practices in 17 high-performing extended time schools. They find that teachers spend 
significantly more time on professional development in extended time schools compared to 
traditional schools (40 percent compared with 20 percent).  Teachers use expanded time for 
activities including collaborative lesson planning, embedded professional development, summer 
training, data analysis, and individualized coaching.   
The North Kansas City School District Extended School Year 
NKCS selected the two schools for ESY separated by several miles so alternative 
neighborhood schools could be available for families who chose to opt out of the extended-year 
option. This policy prescription will aid in our research design since we will be able to match 
ESY schools to geographically contiguous schools within the NKCS boundaries; these 
comparison schools have similar demographics to the ESY schools and serve about 1,100 
students annually. Teachers were also allowed to opt in or out of these schools, and increased 
instructional time means higher salaries for teachers in ESY schools. For beginning teachers, 31 
additional instructional days will increase salaries by over $6,000 per year, and for experienced 
teachers by over $12,000. NKCS expects these policy shifts will be revenue neutral because 
NKCS will increase the number of student attendance days, leveraging state funding from 
regular and summer programming to sustain this endeavor.  
Data 
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  All data for this analysis were provided by NKCS and the Missouri Department of 
Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE).  Student performance, measured with individual-
level state assessment scores for reading and math, were used to determine whether student 
achievement improved in ESY schools.  Demographic characteristics were extracted from school 
district databases in order to determine whether ESY programs close the achievement gap 
between advantaged and disadvantaged students.   
Our treatment group will be all students who attended the NKCS ESY elementary 
schools during both post-intervention academic years, 2015-16 and 2016-17, and attended any 
NKCS elementary school for academic year 2014-15. Our control group will consist of students 
enrolled in contiguous elementary schools within the NKCS district during the same time period.  
A comprehensive list of NKCS elementary schools and the corresponding treatment designations 
may be seen in Appendix A.     
FRL and ELL percentages act as a proxy for percent disadvantaged students in a given 
school.  FRL and ELL percentages for treatment, control, and other district elementary schools 
may be seen in Figure 1.   
Starting in third grade, Missouri students are tested annually using the Missouri 
Assessment Program (MAP).  Through eighth grade, these students are tested on their content 
knowledge in communication arts and mathematics1.  Prior to testing, the State Board of 
Education, with input from various stakeholders, approves a set of achievement cut scores.  
These cut scores, which vary by grade and content area, serve as thresholds dividing student 
MAP scores into four levels of achievement: Below Basic, Basic, Proficient, and Advanced.  
Because MAP scores for individuals are expected to grow over time and can change scale from 
                                                          
1 Fifth and eighth grade students are also tested on content knowledge in science. 
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one year to the next, practitioners often use these achievement levels as a consistent way to 
interpret student data.  The four achievement levels along with a brief description of each may be 
seen in Table 1.     
To get an aggregate view of proficiency, the four levels can be used to calculate 
proficiency rates for districts, schools, or even demographic groups.  To do this, the four 
achievement levels are condensed into two.  Students designated as Level 1 or 2 are deemed Not 
Proficient, and students designated as Level 3 or 4 are deemed Proficient.   
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the changes in proficiency rates for third through fifth graders 
in NKSD elementary schools in communication arts and mathematics, respectively, from 2009 to 
2017.  Elementary schools are clustered into three groups: treatment schools, control schools, 
and other schools.  The two schools that experienced the ESY intervention starting in academic 
year 2015-16 make up the treatment group.  The control schools are the three schools that were 
considered for the ESY intervention, due to their similarity to the treatment schools and 
geographic proximity, but ultimately did not receive it.  The other schools group is made up of 
the remaining NKCSD elementary schools.  The dotted lines denote changes in proficiency rates 
during the ESY intervention.  
The figures have several notable characteristics that informed our methodology.  Each of 
these characteristics will be discussed in turn.   
Our approach for understanding the impact of the ESY intervention is analogous to what 
researchers use to understand medical treatments.  In a medical treatment study, individuals are 
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divided into a treatment and control group based on whether they exhibit the same health 
problem.  For example, if researchers were testing the impact of a diabetes treatment, both the 
treatment and control group would be required to have diabetes.  The treatment group allows us 
to observe the outcome of interest for individuals who are exposed to the intervention.  The 
purpose of the control group is to serve as an approximation for the outcome of interest for the 
treated individuals if they were left untreated.  The impact of the treatment on diabetes is found 
by comparing the average outcomes for those in the treatment group to those in the control 
group.  If the treatment group has better health outcomes than the control group (e.g., lower 
blood sugar) then the treatment is considered effective.  
In the case of the NKCSD, the treatment and control schools should have similar “pre-
treatment” conditions, in this case low achievement as observed by the relatively low 
percentages of proficient students seen in Figures 2 and 3.  The fact that the treatment and 
control schools behave similarly over time regarding proficiency rates provides some evidence 
that we have identified an appropriate control group.  The fact that both of these groups fall 
substantially below the other district schools means that the possibility of affecting change 
through the intervention and being able to detect that change is possible.  In other words, it 
would be difficult to detect change as a result of an intervention implemented if the schools were 
already performing well. 
According to the 2015 MAP technical report2, the 2014 and 2015 MAP assessments are 
not comparable.  Evidence of this can be seen in Figures 2 and 3.  Changes made to the 2015 
assessment are associated with a substantial increase in proficiency rates.  Although the 
assessment change may be enough to explain the large increase in proficiency rates, the scale, 
                                                          
2 https://dese.mo.gov/sites/default/files/asmt-gl-2015-tech-report.pdf accessed on May 29, 2018. 
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and thus the associated cut scores, changed as well.  For example, a third-grade student scoring 
628 or higher on the math assessment would be considered proficient in 2014, but a similar 
student would require a score of 2436 in 2015.  Whether the 2014 and 2015 cut scores have the 
same underlying meaning is uncertain.  Generally speaking, it is difficult to ascertain whether an 
outcome has changed as a result of an intervention when there is a major change in how that 
outcome is measured.  As a result of the 2015 cut score and assessment changes, pre-intervention 
data are omitted for years prior to 2015.   
Because the MAP scale scores change over time, scores were standardized into z-scores 
using statewide means and standard deviations for each grade and content area.  This means that 
the outcome of interest is interpreted as the number of standard deviations a score falls from the 
corresponding statewide average.  For example, a z-score of 0 indicates that there was no 
difference between the test score and the statewide average for the corresponding grade and 
content area.  Positive z-scores indicate that students scored above the statewide average, and 
negative z-scores indicate that students scored below statewide averages.   
Since students at different grade levels experienced different dosages of the intervention, we 
divided students into grade-related groups which we refer to as cohorts.  A description of these 
groups may be seen in Table 2.     
For illustrative purposes, the average standardized MAP Score for the first year of 
intervention are presented in Table 3.  The only consistent pattern we see is that the other district 
schools outperform both the treatment and control groups in communication arts as well as 
mathematics.  Cohort 1 in the treatment group had higher average Communication Arts scores 
than the control group, whereas the reverse was true for Cohorts 2 and 3.  The treatment group in 
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Cohorts 2 and 3 had much larger mathematics scores than the control group.  However, this was 
not the case for Cohort 1.   
Table 3 can help give context to the z-scores.  For example, if treatment school z-scores 
increase by .1, it means that the intervention has helped close the gap between treatment and 
other district schools.  In fact, an increase of .1 for cohort 1 in communication arts, means that 
the intervention has more than doubled the average score for those schools (.086 + .1 = .186) and 
narrows the gap between treatment and other districts schools (original gap:  .308-.086 = .222;  
new gap: .308-.186 = .122, a drop of approximately 45%).   
Methods 
To evaluate differences in student achievement, we use a quasi-experimental design with 
controls for demographic characteristics for students in the treatment and control schools.  We 
compare ESY student outcomes to a control group of students from NKCS elementary schools 
that maintain traditional calendar years. In addition, we will use nearest-neighbor matching based 
on factors such as race/ethnicity, English language proficiency, free and reduced lunch status, 
and grade to compare students in the treatment and control schools. We use difference-in-
differences and nearest-neighbor matching methods to evaluate the effect of the intervention on 
student test score outcomes. 
Although NKCS provided student-level MAP assessment data for 2009 to 2017, 
restrictions were imposed to resolve four main issues: assessment inconsistency, treatment 
designation switching behavior, missing assessment data, and non-typical grade progression.  
Details regarding these restrictions are as follows.   
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First, due to changes in the MAP assessment that extend beyond changes in cut scores 
and scale, data for the pre-intervention period were restricted to one academic year, 2014-15.  
Details regarding these changes can be found in the 2015 MAP Technical Manual.  
Second, since benefits of increased instructional hours are expected to accumulate over 
time, students who switched in or out of treatment or control schools during the intervention 
years are removed from the sample.  This group includes students who stayed within the district 
but switched from one treatment designation in 2016 to a different one in 2017.  For example, a 
student who switches from a treatment school in 2016 to a control school in 2017 is omitted from 
the sample.  This resulted in a loss of 184 observations out of the total 7,632.  Half of these 
observations correspond to student math scores and half student communication arts scores. 
Third, due to a limited sample size, it is possible that if many poorly performing students 
opted out of the intervention and many highly performing students opted into the intervention, 
the results may be biased. It is important to ensure that results were not driven by students who 
moved into the district during the intervention or left prior to the intervention, so we dropped 
students who had missing MAP scores.  For Cohort 1 and 2, this means that students must have 
three years of MAP data, and for Cohort 3, this means that students must have two years of MAP 
data to be included in the analytic sample.   This resulted in a loss of 24 total observations with 
three being from the communication arts treatment group of 267 students, four being from the 
communication arts control group of 410 students, 11 being from the communication arts other 
district group of 3,047 students, and six being from the math other district group of 3047 
students.   
Fourth, students with non-typical grade progression were dropped from the analytic 
sample.   This includes students who repeated or skipped grades.  The rationale for dropping 
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these students is that there is no certain definition for which cohort each student should belong 
which makes appropriate nearest-neighbor matching unclear.  This final restriction resulted in a 
loss of eight observations from the other district schools group, four students from math and four 
from communication arts.  The effects of these general restrictions on our final student counts 
may be seen in Table 4.  The breakdown of the final students counts into treatment groups and 
cohorts may be seen in Table 5. 
Results 
Difference-in-Differences (DID) 
Economists use difference-in-differences methods to examine how a policy affects a 
treatment and control group differently.  Essentially, by comparing the pre-and post- intervention 
outcomes of the treatment group to pre-and post- intervention outcomes of the control group, 
researchers can discern whether the outcome, in this case MAP scores, was affected by the ESY 
intervention. If the treatment has no effect the result of DID estimate will be zero.   If the DID 
estimates are positive, this suggests that the treatment group learned relatively more than the 
control group after the intervention.   
For simplicity, from this point forward we focus our attention on treatment and control 
group outcomes only.  Table 6 presents pre- and post-intervention means by treatment group, 
cohorts, and content area.  The values of interest are found in bold at the intersection of the 
Difference rows and Difference column.  These values are the DID estimates for each cohort and 
content area.  Of the six DID estimates, the only estimate statistically significant at at least the 
5% level is for cohort 2 in mathematics.   This coefficient means that the change in math MAP 
scores for cohort 2 students is .5655 standard deviations greater for the treatment group than then 
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control group between 2015 and 2017. Regression output with the associated standard deviations 
corresponding to these DID estimates may be seen in Appendix B.      
  Regression 
While looking at means or differences in means is relatively easy to understand, it 
ignores the possibility that characteristics outside of the intervention itself may influence the 
outcome of interest.  While Table 6 suggests that the treatment group is moving generally in a 
positive direction for math, it does not control for other explanatory factors such race, gender, 
socioeconomic status, English proficiency, summer school attendance, and school level fixed 
effects.   
Table 7 contains the pooled regression results from Difference-in-Difference (DID) 
models for communication arts and mathematics.  The model is specified in equation 1: 
𝑌 =  𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑇 ∗ 𝑋 + 𝛽 𝑇 + 𝛽 𝑋 +  𝛽 𝐷 + 𝛽 𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐹 + 𝜀      (1) 
𝑌  is the outcome variable and represents the standardized value of student i’s state 
assessment during time t for content area c (e.g., communication arts, mathematics).  𝑇 ∗ 𝑋   is 
the variable of interest, the DID Estimator.  The DID Estimator is equal to 1 for individuals in 
the treatment group during an ESY intervention year and 0 otherwise.  𝑇  is an ESY intervention 
year dummy variable. 𝑋  is a set of dummy variables representing English-lanuguage learner 
status, free and reduced lunch status, race and ethnicity (e.g., white, black, hispanic), and male.  
𝛽  is the value of the intercept.  
These models contain data from all three years for Cohorts 1 and 2 and only the two 
intervention years for Cohort 3.  The numbers corresponding with the variables are estimated 
coefficients, and the numbers in the parentheses are standard errors which allow us to infer 
whether the treatment was significantly different from zero. 
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The variable of interest in this model is the DID Estimator.  The DID Estimator tells us 
whether being in the treatment group in the post-intervention period is associated with improved 
growth in the outcome variable when controlling for other demographic variables.  The DID 
Estimator is positive for Cohorts 1 (.175, p = .287) and 3 (.311, p = .103).  Although this 
suggests that treatment is associated with improved reading outcomes for these groups of 
students compared to their control group peers, the estimated coefficients are not statistically 
significant.  This means that although we have anecdotal evidence, we have no statistical 
evidence to conclude that reading outcomes have actually improved for Cohorts 1 or 3 as a result 
of the ESY intervention.  The DID Estimator is negative for Cohort 2 (-.104, p = .498), but once 
again, this result is not statistically significant.  Free/Reduced Lunch Status, Male, and some 
racial characteristics are also statistically significant in the MAP communication arts models. 
The DID Estimator indicates improved growth in MAP math scores for Cohorts 2 and 3 
compared to its corresponding control group.  Cohort 2 and 3 treatment students grow .458 (p = 
.004) and .364 (p = .054) standard deviations, respectively, more than their control group peers. 
Math growth was not statistically significant for Cohort 1 (.0589, p = .743), meaning that we 
have statistical evidence that the intervention improves math outcomes for the treatment group in 
Cohorts 2 and 3 but not Cohort 1.  Free/Reduced Lunch Status and some racial characteristics are 
also statistically significant in the MAP math models.   
The increases in the z-scores of Cohorts 2 and 3 for math students exposed to the ESY 
intervention are very large, statistically significant effects of the ESY intervention.  
Communication arts and math for Cohort 1 and communication arts for Cohort 3 had positive 
signs but were not statistically significant.  Communication Arts for Cohort 2 had a negative sign 
and was not statistically significant.  
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While the basic regression presented in Table 7 controls for a host of explanatory factors, 
there are additional controls that come easily to mind.  Some of these additional explanatory 
factors were added to the basic regression, and the DID Estimators for each of these regressions 
are presented in Table 8.  The main takeaway from this set of regressions is that even with the 
addition of these other explanatory variables, the magnitude and level of significance of the 
statistically significant coefficients is largely unchanged.   
Row 1 repeats the DID Estimator from Table 7 above.  Row 2 represents the basic 
regression with the addition of a dummy variable for whether a student attended summer school.  
Note that the estimated coefficient for Cohort 3 in reading became statistically significant 
although the magnitude of the coefficient remained approximately the same.  The estimated 
coefficient for Cohort 3 in math increased in its level of significance from 10% to 5% with a 
similar magnitude.  Row 3 is similar to Row 2 in that it attempts to control for summer school 
attendance for the control group.  The difference is that instead of a dummy variable for summer 
school, it includes a variable that is equal to the percent of summer school that a student is 
supposed to attend that he or she actually does attend.  Row 4 includes a dummy variable to 
control for whether a given classroom is run by a new teacher.  New teachers are defined as 
teachers with three or less years of total teaching experience.  Row 5 includes the New Teacher 
dummy variable as well as the summer attendance rate variable used in Row 3.  The full output 
for Rows 2-5 may be seen in Appendix C. 
Nearest Neighbor Matching 
One problem with the above regressions is that treatment is not randomly assigned. To 
account for this, we ran a regression using nearest neighbor matching.  Nearest neighbor 
matching uses the characteristics from each person in the treatment group and finds a match for 
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him or her in the control group based on observable characteristics such as race, gender, English 
proficiency, and free and reduced lunch status.  When no observations can be identified that 
balance characteristics in a similar way, that observation is dropped.   
Table 9 shows the results of the nearest neighbor matching regression.  Since the 
regressions in Table 7 indicated that Free / Reduced Lunch Status held a high degree of 
explanatory power, nearest neighbors were required to match exactly on that variable for both 
communication arts and math analyses.  This is also true for Male in the Communication Arts 
models.  Nearest neighbors were more loosely matched on gender (for math only), pre-
intervention MAP scores, English proficiency, and race.  
The findings are consistent with the pooled regression results for math seen in Table 7.  
The intervention positively influences math achievement for both Cohorts 2 (.364, p = .003) and 
3 (.318, p = .003).  The nearest neighbor results also indicate a positive influence on reading 
achievement for Cohort 3 (.280, p = .010).  All of these coefficients are large and statistically 
significant.  The largest of these estimated coefficients is for Cohort 2 Math.  This coefficient 
means that if all students were treated with the ESY intervention, we would expect that MAP 
math scores would increase by .364 standard deviations on average.  The estimated coefficients 
for Cohort 2 Communication Arts and Cohort 1 Math are positive but not statistically significant.  
The estimated coefficient for Cohort 1 Communication Arts is negative but again is not 
statistically significant.   
Discussion 
Although state assessment data provide a solid foundation upon which to study the 
relationship between academic achievement and the ESY intervention, there is one noticeable 
weakness.  Students are exposed to the treatment from the time they enter the district until the 
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time they leave.  This means that students as young as kindergarten receive the ESY treatment, 
but we are not able to study their achievement levels until they reach third grade— the first time 
they participate in the state assessment.  District benchmark data is collected from an early age.  
In reading, this benchmark assessment is the Fountas & Pinnel (F&P).  The F&P reading 
assessment is scored with letters rather than numeric values.  There are currently no reliable 
mappings of the F&P to numeric values.  It is possible that younger students benefit differently 
from the change in policy than older students, and by failing to measure achievement in the 
earlier grades a potentially important contribution is missed.   
Conclusion 
 
In an effort to narrow the achievement gap, the NKCS District extended the school year 
by 31 instructional days for two of their 21 elementary schools. This study examined whether the 
ESY policy implemented by NKCS improved achievement of students in the treated schools 
relative to a control group of schools with students from similar SES backgrounds.  Regression 
analysis indicates that students who were in 4th grade when the ESY program was implemented 
saw substantial gains in math compared to their control group peers.  Including controls for 
summer school attendance and teacher experience in the basic regression, suggested that in 
addition to 4th graders seeing relative improvement in math, students who were in 3rd grade 
during the first year of the ESY program improved relative to control group peers in both 
communication arts and math.  Creating a nearest-neighbor matched sample produced similar 
results for the same groups of students and content areas. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Missouri Assessment Program (MAP) Achievement Levels 
MAP Achievement Levels 
Level Description 
Level 1: Below Basic Minimal Understanding 
Level 2: Basic Partial Understanding 
Level 3: Proficient Adequate Understanding 
Level 4: Advanced Thorough Understanding 
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Table 2: Description of grade-dependent student groups.  
  2015 2016 2017 Data Notes 
Cohort 1 Grade 4  
(pre-treatment) 
Grade 5 
(treatment) 
Grade 6 
(post-treatment) 
One year of 
treatment, one 
year of post-
treatment, one 
year of pre-
treatment data 
Cohort 2 Grade 3 
(pre-treatment) 
Grade 4 
(treatment) 
Grade 5 
(treatment) 
Two years of 
treatment, one 
year of pre-
treatment data 
Cohort 3  Grade 2 
(no data) 
Grade 3 
(treatment) 
Grade 4 
(treatment) 
Two years of 
treatment, no pre-
treatment data 
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Table 3: Average MAP Z-scores by cohort and treatment designation, 2016. 
 Treatment Control Other 
 Communication Arts 
Cohort 1 .086 .058 .308 
Cohort 2 .052 .153 .334 
Cohort 3 .048 .117 .434 
 Mathematics 
Cohort 1 .213 .266 .490 
Cohort 2 .431 .282 .518 
Cohort 3 .34 .171 .553 
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Table 4: Students omitted from analytic sample due to general restrictions listed above. 
 Communications Arts Mathematics 
 # of Omissions Sample Size # of Omissions Sample Size 
Initial  
Sample 
 3816  3816 
Treatment 
Switchers 
92 3724 92 3724 
Missing MAP 
Scores 
18 3706 6 3718 
Unusual Grade 
Progression 
4 3702 4 3714 
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Table 5: Student counts by treatment status, cohort, and content area. 
  Communication Arts, 
Sample Size 
Mathematics, 
Sample Size 
Treatment Cohort 1 100 100 
 Cohort 2 82 84 
 Cohort 3 82 83 
 Subtotal 264 267 
Control Cohort 1 119 120 
 Cohort 2 136 137 
 Cohort 3 151 153 
 Subtotal 406 410 
Other Cohort 1 962 962 
 Cohort 2 968 970 
 Cohort 3 1102 1105 
 Subtotal 3032 3037 
Total  3702 3714 
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Table 6: DID comparing 2015 to 2017 for Cohorts 1 and 2, and 2016 to 2017 for Cohort 3. 
Communication Arts 
Cohort 1 
 Year = 2017 Year = 2015  
Treatment -.059 -.003 -.0566 
Control .020 .183 -.1637 
Difference -.0791 -.1861 .1070 
Cohort 2 
 Year = 2017 Year = 2015  
Treatment .153 .080 .0730 
Control .203 .109 .0941 
Difference -.0495 -.0284 -.0210 
Cohort 3 
 Year = 2017 Year = 2016  
Treatment .281 .048 .2328* 
Control .027 .117 -.0894 
Difference .2533* -.0689 .3222 
Mathematics 
Cohort 1 
 Year = 2017 Year = 2015  
Treatment -.010 -.032 .0015 
Control .026 .105 -.0786 
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Difference -.0362 -.1372 .1010 
Cohort 2 
 Year = 2017 Year = 2015  
Treatment .571 -.002 .5732*** 
Control .284 .276 .0077 
Difference .2872** -.2782* .5655*** 
Cohort 3 
 Year = 2017 Year = 2016  
Treatment .629 .340 .2885** 
Control .091 .171 -.0803 
Difference .5376*** .1688 .3688* 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
27 
 
Table 7: DID with covariates for Cohorts 1, 2, and 3. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES C1 ELA C2 ELA C3 ELA C1 MATH C2 MATH C3 MATH 
       
DID Estimator 0.175 -0.104 0.311 0.0589 0.458*** 0.364* 
 (0.164) (0.154) (0.190) (0.179) (0.159) (0.189) 
ESY Year Dummy -0.125 0.0730 -0.0892 0.159 0.0191 -0.0780 
 (0.112) (0.0973) (0.113) (0.122) (0.101) (0.112) 
Treatment Dummy -0.391* -0.00750 0.335* -0.133 -0.339 0.415** 
 (0.209) (0.291) (0.191) (0.228) (0.302) (0.190) 
Ell -0.320*** 0.0896 0.161 -0.179* 0.138 0.194* 
 (0.0906) (0.0883) (0.118) (0.0985) (0.0906) (0.116) 
FRL -0.315*** -0.415*** -0.487*** -0.253*** -0.364*** -0.377*** 
 (0.0809) (0.0892) (0.109) (0.0886) (0.0929) (0.109) 
Male -0.224*** -0.160** -0.350*** -0.0240 0.0732 -0.145 
 (0.0695) (0.0720) (0.0931) (0.0760) (0.0743) (0.0922) 
White -0.279*** -0.0870 -0.0340 -0.217** 0.0201 -0.0661 
 (0.0978) (0.0981) (0.138) (0.107) (0.102) (0.135) 
Black -0.368*** -0.218* -0.0212 -0.381*** -0.275** -0.133 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.149) (0.124) (0.118) (0.146) 
Hispanic -0.302*** -0.347*** 0.143 -0.318** -0.331*** -0.0348 
 (0.113) (0.111) (0.164) (0.123) (0.114) (0.161) 
Constant 0.635 -1.428 0.358* 0.237 0.312 0.250 
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 (0.423) (0.929) (0.183) (0.464) (0.968) (0.182) 
       
Observations 657 654 466 660 663 472 
R-squared 0.143 0.150 0.115 0.127 0.176 0.145 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Estimated DID coefficients associated with various regressions.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES C1  
ELA 
C2  
ELA 
C3  
ELA 
C1 
MATH 
C2 
MATH 
C3 
MATH 
       
(1) Basic 0.175 -0.104 0.311 0.0589 0.458*** 0.364* 
 (0.164) (0.154) (0.190) (0.179) (0.159) (0.189) 
(2) Summer Dummy 0.116 -0.150 0.348* -0.0904 0.420*** 0.384** 
+ Basic (0.188) (0.156) (0.189) (0.205) (0.161) (0.189) 
(3) Summer Rate 0.128 -0.156 0.326* -0.0809 0.419*** 0.372** 
+ Basic (0.189) (0.156) (0.189) (0.206) (0.161) (0.189) 
(4) NewTeacher 
Dummy 
0.153 -0.117 0.321* 0.0322 0.430*** 0.464** 
+ Basic (0.163) (0.155) (0.191) (0.179) (0.161) (0.196) 
(5) Summer + Teacher 0.0779 -0.177 0.335* -0.140 0.384** 0.472** 
+ Basic (0.188) (0.158) (0.190) (0.206) (0.163) (0.196) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Nearest Neighbor Matching estimates 
  Communication Arts Math 
  Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 
Treatment 
Status 
-0.0557 0.0214 0.2802** 0.0762 0.364*** 0.318*** 
  (0.107) (0.114) (0.109) (0.101) (0.122) (0.109) 
Observations 219 218 233 220 221 236 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: 2015 FRL and ELL percent of total enrollment by treatment status (DESE) 
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Figure 2: Percentage of third through fifth grade students characterized as Advanced or 
Proficient in communication arts by treatment status, 2009-2017. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of third through fifth grade students characterized as Advanced or 
Proficient in mathematics by treatment status, 2009-2017. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table 10: NKCSD elementary schools by treatment group 
North Kansas City School District Elementary Schools 
by Treatment Status 
Treatment Schools Crestview 
 Winnwood 
Control Schools Chouteau 
 Topping 
 West Englewood 
Other District Schools Bell Prairie 
 Briarcliff 
 Chapel Hill 
 Clardy 
 Davidson 
 Fox Hill 
 Gashland 
 Gracemor 
 Lakewood 
 Linden West 
 Maplewood 
 Meadowbrook 
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 Nashua 
 Northview 
 Oakwood Manor 
 Ravenwood 
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Appendix B 
 
Table 11: Regressions underlying the basic DID table. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES C1 ELA C2 ELA C3 ELA C1 MATH C2 MATH C3 MATH 
       
DID Estimator 0.107 -0.0210 0.322 0.101 0.565*** 0.369* 
 (0.181) (0.187) (0.200) (0.187) (0.198) (0.199) 
ESY Year Dummy -0.164 0.0941 -0.0894 -0.0786 0.00770 -0.0803 
 (0.122) (0.114) (0.118) (0.126) (0.122) (0.118) 
Treatment Dummy -0.186 -0.0284 -0.0689 -0.137 -0.278** 0.169 
 (0.128) (0.132) (0.141) (0.132) (0.140) (0.140) 
Constant 0.183** 0.109 0.117 0.105 0.276*** 0.171** 
 (0.0866) (0.0809) (0.0837) (0.0891) (0.0865) (0.0833) 
       
Observations 438 436 466 440 442 472 
R-squared 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.030 0.034 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 12: Regressions corresponding with Row 2 in Table 8. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES C1 ELA C2 ELA C3 ELA C1 MATH C2 MATH C3 MATH 
       
DID Estimator 0.116 -0.150 0.348* -0.0904 0.420*** 0.384** 
 (0.188) (0.156) (0.189) (0.205) (0.161) (0.189) 
ESY Year Dummy -0.130 0.0551 -0.135 0.145 0.00344 -0.103 
 (0.112) (0.0978) (0.113) (0.122) (0.102) (0.113) 
Treatment Dummy -0.332 0.0910 0.575*** 0.0166 -0.256 0.544*** 
 (0.228) (0.296) (0.205) (0.249) (0.309) (0.204) 
ELL -0.317*** 0.0998 0.160 -0.170* 0.147 0.194* 
 (0.0907) (0.0884) (0.117) (0.0986) (0.0908) (0.116) 
FRL -0.314*** -0.417*** -0.489*** -0.252*** -0.365*** -0.379*** 
 (0.0809) (0.0891) (0.108) (0.0886) (0.0928) (0.109) 
Male -0.223*** -0.156** -0.355*** -0.0218 0.0770 -0.150 
 (0.0696) (0.0719) (0.0923) (0.0760) (0.0743) (0.0921) 
White -0.275*** -0.0935 -0.0663 -0.210** 0.0144 -0.0812 
 (0.0980) (0.0981) (0.137) (0.107) (0.102) (0.135) 
Black -0.367*** -0.215* -0.00679 -0.380*** -0.274** -0.121 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.148) (0.124) (0.118) (0.146) 
Hispanic -0.301*** -0.343*** 0.162 -0.317** -0.329*** -0.0214 
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 (0.114) (0.110) (0.162) (0.123) (0.114) (0.161) 
Summer Dummy -0.0695 -0.128 -0.351*** -0.175 -0.109 -0.192* 
 (0.108) (0.0776) (0.114) (0.117) (0.0803) (0.113) 
Constant 0.638 -1.539* 0.492*** 0.246 0.216 0.324* 
 (0.424) (0.931) (0.187) (0.464) (0.970) (0.187) 
       
Observations 657 654 466 660 663 472 
R-squared 0.143 0.153 0.133 0.130 0.179 0.151 
 
 
  
39 
 
Table 13: Regressions corresponding with Row 3 in Table 8. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES C1 ELA C2 ELA C3 ELA C1 
MATH 
C2 
MATH 
C3 
MATH 
       
DID Estimator 0.128 -0.156 0.326* -0.0809 0.419*** 0.372** 
 (0.189) (0.156) (0.189) (0.206) (0.161) (0.189) 
ESY Year Dummy -0.128 0.0529 -0.129 0.148 0.00313 -0.0997 
 (0.112) (0.0977) (0.113) (0.122) (0.102) (0.113) 
Treatment Dummy -0.344 0.129 0.538*** 0.00641 -0.235 0.525** 
 (0.229) (0.299) (0.207) (0.250) (0.311) (0.206) 
ELL -0.317*** 0.104 0.164 -0.168* 0.149 0.195* 
 (0.0909) (0.0884) (0.118) (0.0988) (0.0909) (0.116) 
FRL -0.315*** -0.416*** -0.495*** -0.254*** -0.364*** -0.382*** 
 (0.0809) (0.0890) (0.109) (0.0886) (0.0928) (0.109) 
Male -0.224*** -0.156** -0.362*** -0.0234 0.0764 -0.153* 
 (0.0696) (0.0718) (0.0927) (0.0760) (0.0742) (0.0923) 
White -0.276*** -0.0960 -0.0654 -0.211** 0.0129 -0.0816 
 (0.0980) (0.0980) (0.137) (0.107) (0.102) (0.136) 
Black -0.367*** -0.216* -0.0182 -0.378*** -0.275** -0.129 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.148) (0.124) (0.118) (0.146) 
Hispanic -0.301*** -0.349*** 0.152 -0.317** -0.334*** -0.0276 
 (0.114) (0.110) (0.163) (0.123) (0.114) (0.161) 
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Summer Rate -0.0607 -0.162* -0.307** -0.180 -0.124 -0.168 
 (0.121) (0.0853) (0.124) (0.131) (0.0882) (0.124) 
Constant 0.637 -1.581* 0.477** 0.245 0.193 0.315* 
 (0.424) (0.931) (0.189) (0.464) (0.971) (0.188) 
       
Observations 657 654 466 660 663 472 
R-squared 0.143 0.154 0.126 0.130 0.179 0.149 
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Table 14: Regressions corresponding with Row 4 in Table 8. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES C1 ELA C2 ELA C3 ELA C1 MATH C2 MATH C3 MATH 
       
DID Estimator 0.153 -0.117 0.321* 0.0322 0.430*** 0.464** 
 (0.163) (0.155) (0.191) (0.179) (0.161) (0.196) 
ESY Year Dummy -0.120 0.0639 -0.0700 0.161 0.00734 -0.126 
 (0.110) (0.0978) (0.116) (0.121) (0.101) (0.115) 
Treatment Dummy -0.365* 0.0240 0.331* -0.119 -0.289 0.366* 
 (0.207) (0.292) (0.191) (0.228) (0.303) (0.191) 
ELL -0.315*** 0.0809 0.165 -0.175* 0.125 0.197* 
 (0.0898) (0.0884) (0.118) (0.0981) (0.0907) (0.116) 
FRL -0.289*** -0.408*** -0.485*** -0.240*** -0.355*** -0.372*** 
 (0.0803) (0.0893) (0.109) (0.0881) (0.0930) (0.109) 
Male -0.206*** -0.150** -0.349*** -0.00751 0.0824 -0.144 
 (0.0690) (0.0721) (0.0932) (0.0757) (0.0744) (0.0920) 
White -0.260*** -0.0890 -0.0351 -0.218** 0.0229 -0.0652 
 (0.0975) (0.0981) (0.138) (0.106) (0.102) (0.135) 
Black -0.381*** -0.188 -0.0218 -0.402*** -0.250** -0.131 
 (0.113) (0.117) (0.149) (0.123) (0.119) (0.145) 
Hispanic -0.297*** -0.344*** 0.138 -0.323*** -0.330*** -0.0385 
 (0.113) (0.110) (0.164) (0.123) (0.114) (0.161) 
New Teacher 0.238*** -0.0146 -0.151 0.210** -0.110 -0.255* 
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 (0.0887) (0.105) (0.192) (0.0941) (0.107) (0.139) 
Constant 0.605 -1.467 0.346* 0.241 0.256 0.268 
 (0.420) (0.929) (0.184) (0.461) (0.967) (0.182) 
       
Observations 654 650 466 657 659 472 
R-squared 0.152 0.146 0.116 0.135 0.172 0.151 
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Table 15: Regressions corresponding with Row 5 in Table 8. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES C1 ELA C2 ELA C3 ELA C1 
MATH 
C2 
MATH 
C3 
MATH 
       
DID Estimator 0.0779 -0.177 0.335* -0.140 0.384** 0.472** 
 (0.188) (0.158) (0.190) (0.206) (0.163) (0.196) 
ESY Year Dummy -0.126 0.0433 -0.111 0.148 -0.00968 -0.148 
 (0.111) (0.0982) (0.116) (0.121) (0.102) (0.116) 
Treatment Dummy -0.290 0.173 0.533** 0.0522 -0.170 0.476** 
 (0.228) (0.301) (0.207) (0.250) (0.313) (0.208) 
ELL -0.310*** 0.0956 0.167 -0.162* 0.137 0.198* 
 (0.0901) (0.0885) (0.118) (0.0982) (0.0909) (0.116) 
FRL -0.289*** -0.409*** -0.493*** -0.240*** -0.355*** -0.376*** 
 (0.0804) (0.0891) (0.109) (0.0880) (0.0929) (0.109) 
Male -0.206*** -0.146** -0.361*** -0.00597 0.0863 -0.152* 
 (0.0690) (0.0720) (0.0928) (0.0756) (0.0744) (0.0921) 
White -0.257*** -0.0975 -0.0662 -0.213** 0.0158 -0.0806 
 (0.0977) (0.0980) (0.137) (0.106) (0.102) (0.135) 
Black -0.379*** -0.186 -0.0188 -0.401*** -0.249** -0.127 
 (0.113) (0.116) (0.148) (0.123) (0.118) (0.145) 
Hispanic -0.296*** -0.347*** 0.148 -0.324*** -0.334*** -0.0314 
 (0.113) (0.110) (0.163) (0.123) (0.114) (0.160) 
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Summer Rate -0.0960 -0.170** -0.305** -0.219* -0.136 -0.167 
 (0.121) (0.0861) (0.125) (0.131) (0.0890) (0.124) 
New Teacher 0.241*** -0.0203 -0.138 0.217** -0.114 -0.255* 
 (0.0888) (0.105) (0.191) (0.0940) (0.107) (0.139) 
Constant 0.608 -1.635* 0.465** 0.252 0.121 0.333* 
 (0.420) (0.931) (0.189) (0.460) (0.970) (0.188) 
       
Observations 654 650 466 657 659 472 
R-squared 0.153 0.151 0.127 0.139 0.175 0.155 
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Chapter 2:  Linking Incongruent Data Sources: A Case Study of a Summer Library Program  
 This chapter is coauthored with Meghan Ecker-Lyster, Ph.D. and Karin Chang, Ph.D.. 
Introduction 
A wealth of empirical evidence demonstrates that the educational achievement gap is 
exacerbated by economic inequality. Compared with children from advantaged backgrounds, 
children from low-income families are less likely to score as proficient on school reading 
assessments (Jencks & Phillips, 1998; Reardon, 2011), graduate from high school (Losen, 2004; 
Rumberger, 2011), and attend college (Goldrick-Rab & Pfeffer, 2009; Bailey & Dynarski, 2011).  
Although there are many underlying causes of income-based disparities, low-income children are 
more vulnerable to summer learning loss than their wealthier peers (Cooper et al., 1996; 
Entwisle, Alexander, & Olson, 2000).  
To better understand summer learning loss, the “faucet theory” suggests that 
opportunities to learn and access educational resources are “turned on” for all children during the 
academic year, and are accessed equally, however the school resources are “turned off” during 
the summer months when school is not in session (Entwisle et al., 2000).  As a result of the 
faucet being shut off during the summer months, low-income students whose families cannot 
afford to provide supplemental educational resources and learning opportunities are put at a 
distinct disadvantage compared to their affluent peers. On average, children from middle-income 
homes have access to approximately twelve books per child, whereas, children from low-income 
families have access to about one book per child (Celano & Nueman, 2008).  
To combat summer learning loss a number of districts and communities have 
implemented summer reading programs. Local public libraries are a key player in the delivery of 
summer reading programs, as this is one community establishment that offers all children, 
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regardless of income level, equal access to learning opportunities (e.g., books).  Over 95% of 
libraries in the U.S. offer a summer reading program (NCES, 2014). Research has found 
promising evidence regarding the success of public library summer reading programs on 
enhancing student reading outcomes (e.g., Roman & Fiore, 2010; Los Angeles County, 2001; 
Shin & Krashen, 2008).  
The literature on summer learning loss and summer reading programs address major 
aspects of the efficacy of these interventions on student outcomes, however the literature leaves 
important questions around measurement largely unanswered.  Many evaluation studies utilize 
the same standardized reading assessment, such as the Scholastic Reading Inventory (SRI), to 
measure the impact of library reading programs on student outcomes (Roman & Fiore, 2015).  
Few studies explicitly explore the methods necessary to successfully leverage extant reading data 
across multiple school districts, which often contain a myriad of reading assessments.   
Study Purpose and Research Questions 
A major challenge to evaluating the impact of a library summer reading program (SRP) is 
accessing the necessary data to adequately measure program success. Many programs do not 
have the resources nor time to administer a specific reading assessment to participants. A cost-
effective alternative is to obtain reading data from the local school districts that send students to 
the library’s reading program.  However, school districts choose benchmark assessments 
individually and there is considerable variability across schools, grade levels and content areas in 
terms of which benchmark assessment is used.  Thus, working with multiple districts, many of 
whom choose different assessments, poses some methodological challenges.      
The purpose of this study was to develop a data-driven, research method that could be 
used to measure and evaluate the impact of SRP.  The primary research question that guided the 
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evaluation study was: Do students who participate in an SRP experience comparable levels of 
summer learning loss compared to similar students who did not participate in the program?  
Data 
The SRP that was evaluated in this study was developed by the Mid-Continent Public 
Library which serves the Kansas City Metropolitan Area (KCMA).  Data for this study were 
derived from two primary sources: the SRP program records and extant academic data from 
participating school districts. Data for this analysis corresponded to three points in time.  Pre-
intervention data were denoted Spring and came from the spring of academic year 2016-17.  
Post-intervention data were denoted Fall and came from the fall of academic year 2017-18.  
Intervention data were denoted Participation and corresponded to the intervention which 
occurred during the summer of 2017.   
Approximately 11,000 students from 21 public school districts as well as various private 
and charter schools across the KCMA participated in the 2017 SRP.  Data were solicited from 16 
of the 21 public school districts, and data sharing agreements were ultimately executed with 
eight.  The 16 districts were chosen primarily due to size.  The data sharing agreement specified 
that Spring and Fall datasets be submitted as separate rather than aggregate files.  This 
specification necessitated additional time be set aside to create a matched Spring – Fall dataset.  
Commentary regarding the rationale behind this decision and its applicability to areas of high 
student mobility may be see in Appendix A.  The distribution of participants across districts and 
by participation status may be seen in Figure 1.   
Spring and Fall data were administrative data provided by the eight participating public-
school districts.  Spring and Fall data elements consisted of identifiers such as name, birth date, 
and state identification numbers, demographic information and benchmark reading scores.  
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Participation data were self-reported by participants and then provided to us by MCPL.  The 
data corresponded to students who participated in the 2017 SRP.  Participation variables 
consisted of name, birthdate, school, and grade.  Note that Participation data did not include 
numeric identifiers; this created challenges, as discussed later in the paper, when joining the 
various datasets.  A full list of requested elements may be seen in the sample Memorandum of 
Understanding located in Appendix B.     
Methods 
The analytic sample for this study consisted of a treatment group, defined as first through 
fifth grade students who participated in the 2017 SRP, and a control group of similarly aged 
students who did not participate.  Figure 2 presents the grade distribution of all participants in 
the SRP as reported by the parents of these participants or by the participants themselves to the 
MCPL staff.  Notice that a substantial percentage of participants did not report grade 
information.  Due to the higher likelihood of inaccuracy in these data, observations were dropped 
based on district data rather than Participation.  More specifically, student records were dropped 
if they could not be linked to district data at all or if once linked to the district data, students 
appeared to be outside the range of first through fifth grades.  Students who were in kindergarten 
or younger during Spring 2016-17 were dropped from the analytic sample due to lack of 
assessment measures.  Students older than fifth grade were dropped due to small sample sizes. 
Linking Data Sources 
The decision to match Spring with Participation data rather than Fall with Participation 
was arbitrary, but the decision to match district data to Participation before matching district to 
district was intentional.  As evaluators, our primary responsibility was reporting on the efficacy 
of the program, but due to the annual replication of this study, it was equally important that we 
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assess the quality of data collection related to participation and make recommendations 
accordingly.  Participation data, particularly the identification variables such as name and date 
of birth, were prone to errors, missing information, and as discussed in Appendix C, informal 
variations of names.  We wanted to know how much the quality of these data influenced our 
ability to match Participation to district data.  By matching Participation to Spring first, we 
could determine the percentage of SRP participants that were identifiable in the district data 
through name-matching.  This percentage provides insight into the quality of the Participation 
data and the related collection process.  
Standardizing Assessment Scores 
The raw data for this evaluation reported student assessment scores across five different 
reading measures: Lexiles, Fountas & Pinnell (F&P), Curriculum-Based Measure of Oral 
Reading (RCBM), Rausch Unit Scale (RIT), and STAR Reading (STAR) Scores. Because these 
assessment scores were based on varying scales, we standardized each to get scores that are 
comparable across all districts and grades.  Student records containing only F&P scores were 
dropped from the analytic sample.  This is because F&P scores are non-numeric and currently 
there was no agreed upon method by which to quantify these data.  While this only affected one 
of the eight districts, it was the largest of the participating districts and dropped a substantial 
number of observations.  The equation used to standardize the remaining assessments was: 
 
𝑍 =  
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
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Sample averages and standard deviations were functions of assessment type and grade.  
For example, the z-score calculation for a third-grade student taking the RCBM assessment 
utilized the sample average and standard deviation of the third-grade students across the eight 
districts that took the RCBM assessment.  However, when assessment companies publish 
norming sample means and standard deviations, these statistics were used in place of our sample-
based statistics.   
The benefit of standardizing assessment scores was two-fold.  First, it allowed us to keep 
observations of students who took a different assessment in the fall than what he or she took in 
the spring.  This was particularly important because it was not uncommon for districts to change 
assessments from one academic year to the next, and with a highly mobile student population, it 
was also likely that students would move from one district to another that took a different 
assessment.  The second benefit of standardizing assessment scores was that scores became 
comparable across all grades and assessment types.  Because assessment scores were then 
interpreted as the number of standard deviations that a given score was away from the 
corresponding mean, the downside of standardizing was that it could be difficult for practitioners 
and lay audiences to understand the findings.  The ease in which we could convert z-scores into 
something meaningful depended on the audience (e.g., parents, practitioners, administrators, etc.) 
but was necessary because of the inconsistency of assessment types. 
Creating the Matched Sample 
One difficulty when analyzing treatment effects is a situation that may arise when 
involvement in the intervention is not randomly assigned.  When the mechanism by which 
students are influenced to enter treatment is also related to the outcome in question, estimating 
treatment effects without accounting for this will result in biased estimates.  For these data, 
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treatment and control groups look dissimilar in terms of observable characteristics which causes 
some concern.  Figures 3 and 4 illustrate some of these differences 
Treatment group students were more likely to be white (61 percent compared to 53 
percent), and less likely to be male (47 percent compared to 50 percent), black (17 percent 
compared to 23 percent), or Hispanic (12 percent compared to 14 percent).  Asian and other 
racial groups were represented similarly in both the treatment and control groups. and Table 1 
presents means by treatment group along with the p-value associated with the null hypothesis 
that treatment means and control means are equal.  Averages by treatment group are presented in 
Table 1 along with the p-value associated with the null hypothesis that treatment means and 
control means are equal. 
It also appeared that treatment students were also less likely to receive free or reduced 
lunch, it was difficult to determine whether that was actually the case.  The Community 
Eligibility Provision (CEP) allows districts that are 40% FRL or higher to designate all students 
as FRL.  One of the districts in our sample used this provision and this may have altered the 
distribution of this variable across treatment designations.  Treatment group students were much 
more likely to be enrolled in summer school (68 percent compared to 33 percent).  Although 
summer school attendance may have been another important factor in determining the effect of 
the SRP intervention on student reading outcomes, this variable is missing in a substantial 
number of cases. 
Because of these differences in demographic characteristics and the fact that assignment 
to the intervention is not random, we opted to create a matched sample.  We accomplished this 
by using the coarsened exact matching algorithm in Stata as described by Blackwell, et al (2009).  
For this algorithm, characteristics are more broadly defined, which is particularly helpful for 
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continuous variables.  Groupings of characteristics are assigned to “bins”.  Treatment and control 
observations that are designated to each of these bins based on their characteristics are 
considered matches.  When treatment observations are assigned to a bin for which there are no 
corresponding control observations, then these treatment observations are dropped and otherwise 
for control observations.  For this study, the coarsened exact matching was based on pre-
intervention standardized assessment scores, summer school attendance status, free and reduced 
lunch status, white, gender.  The reason that we included the spring test score as a matching 
element is that we wanted to ensure that students were starting out a similar level of proficiency.  
The logical argument behind this idea is that if we look at two students who are similar in all 
ways except their exposure to the intervention, then the more likely it is that the intervention is 
the cause for any differences in the outcome variable.   
Before the matching algorithm, we had 10,462 control observations and 1,577 treatment 
observations.  The algorithm identified 1,354 control observations without matching treatment 
observations and eleven treatment with no corresponding controls.  Our final sample sizes were 
9,108 control and 1,566 treatment observations. 
Table 2 contains the averages by matched treatment groups.  After matching, averages 
are statistically equivalent for gender, Hispanic, Asian, other races, and free and reduced lunch 
status.  Summer school attendance status (p = .0000), white (p = .0450), black (p = .0159), and 
English-language learner status (p = .0675)  remained statistically dissimilar for the two groups. 
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Results 
Difference-in-Differences 
Economists use difference-in-differences methods to examine how a policy or 
intervention affects a treatment and control group differently.  Essentially, by comparing the pre-
and post- intervention outcomes of the treatment group to pre-and post- intervention outcomes of 
the control group, researchers can discern whether the outcome, in this case reading assessment 
scores, was affected by the SRP intervention. If the treatment has no effect the result of DID 
estimate will be zero.   If the DID estimates are positive, this suggests that the treatment group 
learned relatively more than the control group after the intervention.   
Table 3 presents pre- and post-intervention means by treatment group.  The value of 
interest is found in bold at the intersection of the Difference row and Difference column.  This 
value is the DID estimate.  This coefficient means that the change in standardized reading 
assessments scores is 5.9 standard deviations greater for the treatment group than the control 
group between spring and fall.  In other words, the treatment group appears to be worse off as a 
result of the intervention in terms of the amount that they fall between pre- and post-assessments.  
However, it is worth noting that despite the fact that the treatment group drops by a greater 
amount, they stay, on average, above the sample mean.  
While looking at means or differences in means is relatively easy to understand, it 
ignores the possibility that characteristics outside of the intervention itself may influence the 
outcome of interest.  While Table 3 suggests that the treatment group is falling more between 
spring and fall than the control group, it does not control for other explanatory factors such race, 
gender, socioeconomic status, and English proficiency.     
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Table 4 contains the regression results for the DID model presented in Table 3 as well as two 
additional columns to represent DID models with covariates.   
The estimated equation from the regression found in Table 4 Column 2 is represented by 
Equation 1: 
 
𝑌 =  𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑇 ∗ 𝑋 + 𝛽 𝑇 + 𝛽 𝑋 +  𝛽 𝐷 + 𝛽 𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐹 + 𝜀                                         (1) 
 
𝑌  represents the standardized post-intervention reading assessment score for individual i.  The 
variable of interest, the DID Estimator, is represented by 𝑇 ∗ 𝑋 .  This variable is equal to 1 for 
treated individuals during the post-intervention period. 𝑇  is a dummy variable representing the 
post-intervention period.  𝑋  is a set of demographic dummy variables for male, white, black, 
Hispanic, ELL status, FRL status, and summer school attendance status.      
Notice that the sample size dropped by approximately 32 percent between the basic DID 
regression and the DID regression with covariates (column 2).  This is because one of the larger 
districts, in an effort to ensure privacy for students, had established a policy of refusing to 
provide information about student FRL status in samples where students were identified.  
Because student identification is necessary to merge Spring, Fall, and Participation datasets, we 
were not able to acquire the FRL data for this district.  Because of this, we ran the DID 
regression with covariates excluding the FRL variable.  The output for this regression may be 
seen in Column 3 of Table 4.   
The numbers corresponding with the variables in Table 4 are estimated coefficients, and 
the numbers in the parentheses are standard errors which allow us to infer whether the treatment 
was significantly different from zero.  This DID Estimator suggests that when observable 
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characteristics are taken into account, treatment group students are even worse off relative to the 
control group than they appeared in the basic DID analysis.  More specifically, the column 2 
regression indicates that the intervention is associated with an almost seven standard deviation 
greater drop in reading scores for the treatment group as compared to the control group.  Column 
3 estimates a 4.6 standard deviation greater drop between pre- and post-intervention assessments 
compared to the control group.  Both of these results are significant at the 1 percent level. 
Nearest Neighbor Matching 
Although we parsed our sample using the coarsened exact match algorithm in order to get 
more comparable observations between the treatment and control groups, we turned to nearest 
neighbor matching in order to compute a counterfactual for each of the observations that 
remained in the analytic sample.  The nearest-neighbor algorithm estimates the counterfactual for 
each observation by identifying one or more students who are similar in terms of a collection of 
designated observable characteristics.  More specifically, the comparison group for a single 
treated student will be made up of one or more students who are untreated but have similar 
observable characteristics. Treatment and control students matched exactly on the district that 
they attended in the spring, otherwise, treatment and control students were match based on a 
weighted function of gender, race, English language learner status, and spring test score.   
Once the match was made, the estimate of the counterfactual outcome variable was 
calculated.  The average difference between all students’ actual and estimated counterfactual 
outcomes is called the average treatment effect (ATE). 
Table 5 presents our nearest-neighbor estimates of the ATE of the SRP intervention on 
student reading outcomes.  Compared to similar students, SRP participants had better fall reading 
outcomes following the intervention. The estimated average treatment effect was 1.518 (p = 
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.116), meaning that reading outcomes would be 1.518 standard deviations higher if all students 
participated in the SRP compared to when no students participate. The output also indicates that 
ties-in-distance caused at least one observation to be matched with five other observations. What 
this means is that the nearest-neighbor matching algorithm identified all equally good 
observations and averaged the associated outcomes to calculate the counterfactual in an effort to 
reduce bias.  However, this result is not statistically significant. 
Columns 2 – 4 include all of the same variables in the basic nearest neighbor analysis but 
add controls for FRL status and summer school attendance status.  Summer school status is 
added in such a way that students in the treatment group must match exactly on that variable to 
students in the control group.  FRL status is added to the analysis in a way that it becomes part of 
the weighted function of observable characteristics.  Column 2 includes all of the basic variables 
plus the FRL status variable and estimates an ATE of 2.253 (p = .034).  This means that if all 
students participated in the SRP, post-intervention reading assessment scores would be expected 
to be 2.253 standard deviations higher on average.  This result is significant at the 5 percent 
level.  Including the summer school attendance variable instead of the FRL status variable, 
Column 3, provides a similar result.  In this case the ATE is estimated to be 3.552 (p = .011) and 
is once again significant at the 5 percent level.  The final specification includes both the summer 
school attendance as well as the FRL status variables.  The ATE is estimated as 5.269 (p = .001).  
This estimate is substantial in size and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Conclusion 
Leveraging secondary data sources is a cost-effective approach to evaluating community 
programs, such as a summer library program. However, complexity is introduced when data is 
solicited from multiple sources (e.g., school districts, public library), which pose many 
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challenges for linking and summarizing outcomes. The purpose of this study was to highlight a 
data-driven, research method that can be used to measure and evaluate program outcomes that 
rely on data from numerous sources. This case study highlights a methodological approach that 
was used to evaluate the impact of a summer library program on reducing summer learning loss. 
Results indicated that the SRP was an effective intervention for reducing the impact of summer 
learning loss for participants.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status (Full Sample) 
 
 Treated Untreated p-value 
(H0: meantreated = meanuntreated) 
Male .474 .503 .0281 
White .613 .528 .0000 
Black .166 .229 .0000 
Hispanic .119 .139 .0277 
Asian .014 .018 .2990 
Other race .088 .086 .8204 
ELL .032 .047 .0096 
FRL .453 .484 .0526 
Summer .676 .331 .0000 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status (Matched Sample) 
 
 
 
Treated Untreated p-value 
(H0: meantreated = meanuntreated) 
Male .474 .494 .1470 
White .612 .585 .0450 
Black .167 .192 .0159 
Hispanic .119 .127 .4079 
Asian .014 .016 .5607 
Other race .088 .080 .2661 
ELL .033 .042 .0675 
FRL .454 .460 .6975 
Summer .676 .375 .0000 
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Table 3: Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimates by treatment group 
 Post-Intervention 
(Fall) 
Pre-Intervention 
(Spring) 
Difference 
Treatment 1.953 14.860 -12.9070*** 
Control -2.133 4.877 -7.0104*** 
Difference 4.0858*** 9.9823*** -5.8966*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: DID regression output 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES basic with cov with cov 
    
DID Estimator -5.897*** -6.928*** -4.607** 
 (1.973) (2.600) (2.118) 
Post-Year Dummy -7.010*** -7.058*** -7.121*** 
 (0.756) (0.933) (0.825) 
Treatment Dummy 9.982*** 12.23*** 11.23*** 
 (1.395) (1.858) (1.520) 
Male  -7.768*** -8.042*** 
  (0.872) (0.761) 
White  -12.03*** -6.981*** 
  (1.526) (1.333) 
Black  -16.02*** -15.09*** 
  (1.808) (1.499) 
Hispanic  -5.941*** -4.670*** 
  (1.856) (1.648) 
ELL  -19.83*** -22.38*** 
  (2.179) (1.949) 
FRL  -10.15***  
  (0.917)  
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Summer School Dummy  -9.998*** -12.42*** 
  (0.945) (0.822) 
Constant 4.877*** 26.75*** 20.27*** 
 (0.534) (1.665) (1.389) 
    
Observations 21,348 14,506 18,170 
R-squared 0.009 0.046 0.045 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Nearest-Neighbor ATE Estimates 
 
 (1) 
Basic 
(2) 
Basic + FRL 
(3) 
Basic + Summer3 
 
(4) 
Basic + FRL + 
Summer3 
Average 
Treatment Effect 
1.518 2.253** 3.552** 5.269*** 
Standard Error (0.965) (1.060) (1.403) (1.530) 
Observations 10,588 8,842 9,085 7,252 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
                                                          
3 Exact match 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of SRP participants across school districts 
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       Figure 2: Grade distribution of SRP Participation data 
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       Figure 3: Demographic Characteristics by Treatment Status 
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       Figure 4: Demographic Characteristics by Treatment Status 
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Appendix A: Separate versus Aggregate District Data 
In the early years of the evaluation process, districts were asked to submit spring and fall 
data as a single dataset rather than separate files.  While not needing to merge spring and fall 
datasets saved considerable time, there was one major disadvantage.  Some of the participating 
districts have highly mobile student populations, and when submitting the data for analysis, 
districts often deleted any incomplete student records.  In other words, when a student was not 
enrolled for both spring and fall semesters, districts often dropped the student from the district 
data submission.  Incomplete records are usually dropped during analysis, so under typical 
circumstances it would not matter whether the district submitted the incomplete student records.  
Since we work with a number of districts in close proximity to each other, we have an 
opportunity to identify missing student data across multiple districts.  For example, if a student 
attended District A during the spring and then transferred to District B during the fall, if District 
B is one of our participating districts then we can maintain that student’s record in the analytic 
sample by simply matching his partial record from District A to his partial record from District 
B.  Although districts would have been willing to resubmit the data to include incomplete student 
records, we tried to avoid this whenever possible. Because the continued success of this project 
hinges on district participation, it is important to minimize the effort required by district staff.   
Because we received two data files, Spring and Fall, from each district for the summer 
2017 evaluation, we recoded variables for individual districts and then created master spring and 
master fall datasets which contained all student records from all districts for the corresponding 
semester.  The master Spring dataset was matched with MCPL Participation data, and then the 
resulting data were matched with the master Fall dataset. 
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Appendix B:  Example Memorandum of Understanding 
Memorandum of Understanding between SCHOOL DISTRICT, MID-CONTINENT PUBLIC 
LIBRARY and the UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS CENTER FOR RESEARCH, INC. 
 
WHEREAS, School District, the Mid-Continent Public Library and the University of Kansas 
Center for Research, Inc. (KUCR) on behalf of the Kansas City Area Education Research 
Consortium (KC-AERC) wish to create an independent, non-partisan vehicle of the very highest 
quality to evaluate the effect of the summer reading program efforts and contribute to basic 
scholarly research on public schools and educational programming; and 
 
WHEREAS, in order to advance these goals, it is necessary to create a digital data archive 
consisting of longitudinal data that have been fully cleaned, integrated, and documented; and 
WHEREAS, data on student characteristics, student academic performance, and school 
characteristics are necessary to address the foreseeable research questions of the Consortium and 
the public it serves; and 
WHEREAS, to achieve these purposes, the Consortium will release standardized data to a broad 
public while protecting the individual-level confidentiality. 
Now therefore, the parties agree as follows: 
1. School District will appoint a data liaison to coordinate this work (at School District) 
who will facilitate access to the data, and arrange for the staff resources necessary to 
create all data files to be provided to KUCR. 
2. The Mid-Continent Public Library will appoint a liaison to coordinate this work, 
facilitate access to the data, and arrange for the staff resources necessary to conduct the 
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project. The library will support data technician(s) on KUCR staff or as consultants, as 
necessary and commensurate with the scale and scope of actual data transferred. 
3. Once this MOU has been fully executed by all parties, KUCR will provide resources to 
clean, organize, match, and manage all data files provided for the project. KUCR will 
design and execute a methodology for analyzing the data. 
4. School District will, through a data liaison, or other representative, resolve in a timely 
fashion through discussions with the Executive Director or other staff of KUCR any 
questions that arise concerning the content, timing, or other aspects of the data transfer. 
5. School District will provide the staff resources needed to assist, in a timely fashion, with 
the design and documentation of the data, and create or supply the extract files for 
KUCR from the administrative systems of the School District.   
6. School District and Mid-Continent Public Library will provide KUCR with the data 
needed to sustain the mission of evaluating efforts of the reading program.  School 
District will provide extracts containing the following types of student information for 
every student enrolled in pre-kindergarten through 12th grade for the school years 2016-
2017 and 2017-2018:  
 
Spring, Academic Year 2016-2017 
 
Fall, Academic Year 2017-2018 
 
MOSIS (or KIDS) student identification 
number (scrambled using an agreed-upon 
algorithm) 
MOSIS (or KIDS) student identification 
number (scrambled using an agreed-upon 
algorithm) 
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Student first name Student first name 
Student middle name Student middle name 
Student last name Student last name 
Student date of birth Student date of birth 
Student grade level Student grade level 
Student race  
Student gender  
Student free lunch status  
Student reduced lunch status  
Student special education  
Student English Language Learner (ELL) 
status 
 
Student benchmark reading and math 
assessment scores (e.g., i-Ready, STAR, 
AIMSweb) 
Student benchmark reading and math 
assessment scores (e.g., i-Ready, STAR, 
AIMSweb) 
Indicate if student attended district summer school in 2017 
 
7. It is anticipated that modifications to this MOU will be issued for future requested data 
elements for the following school years: 2018-2019, 2019-2020, and the 2020-2021. 
Any modification of this MOU shall be in writing and shall be signed by both parties.  
8. School District will provide KUCR with the data described above for students in pre-
kindergarten through 12th grade attending all schools for which School District 
maintains data, including elementary, alternative schools, collaborative programs and 
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special education programs. The feasible beginning date (i.e., historical and longitudinal 
character) of the data will be determined in consultation with School District.  
9. KUCR will preserve the confidentiality of all personally identifiable information about 
all individual students obtained pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding in 
accordance with applicable law, including the Federal Social Security Act, the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act and any regulations promulgated there under.  All 
studies will be conducted in a manner that does not permit personal identification of 
parents, teachers and students by persons other than required for research activities 
undertaken by representatives of KUCR.  As such, KUCR will not disclose any such 
information to any persons except as authorized by law and upon formal approval of 
School District and will include results in aggregate or in some other non-personally 
identifiable form. KUCR assures all researchers who are given access to data with 
individual-level identifiers provided pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding will 
have undergone appropriate training. 
10. KUCR will subject all research initiated under this Memorandum of Understanding to 
review and approval by KUCR’s Human Research Protection Program, as applicable. 
KUCR may publish results, analysis, or other information developed as a result of any 
research based on the data made available under this agreement only in summary or 
aggregate form, ensuring that no personally-identifiable information is disclosed. 
11. KUCR will create a standardized series of data files for broader public release.  
Standardized data is defined as aggregate school-level data or individual-level data that 
has been stripped of individual-level identifiers and cannot generate any possible 
multivariate analysis combining data fields that would yield less than five records per 
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any data cell.  Standardized data files will be reviewed for considerations of accuracy 
and privacy by School District prior to public release, if a public release is planned. 
12. The agreement between School District, the Mid-Continent Public Library, and KUCR 
is effective as of the date of the last signature and shall continue 60 days after the 
evaluation agreement authorized by MCPL and KUCR ends. It is anticipated that the 
evaluation agreement will continue through 02/28/2021, unless terminated earlier by 
either party. Either party may terminate this agreement provided written notification is 
received by the other party 30 days prior to the proposed termination date.  
 
By signing below, the official certifies that he or she has the authority to bind the organization to 
the terms of this Understanding and that the organization has the capability to undertake the 
commitments in this Understanding.  
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Appendix C: Difficulties Related to Name-matching 
As previously noted, Participation data do not include a numeric identifier, so the 
matching process between Participation and Spring datasets relied primarily on names.  Name-
matching these two datasets was a time-intensive endeavor for three main reasons:  use of 
informal name in the Participation dataset, inconsistent spelling of names, and missing 
information.  The biggest challenge of the three is the use of informal names.  District data 
provide formal or legal names while Participation data are typically more informal (i.e., 
nicknames).  For example, the name “Theodore” in Spring might be listed as “Ted”, “Teddy” or 
“Theo” in Participation.  Although these variations on the name “Theodore” make algorithmic 
matching difficult, it is still possible to join this student’s data from one dataset to the other 
because these variations are commonplace and widely known.  Where this process may become 
impossible is when informal names are unrelated to the formal name.  This is particularly 
prevalent in districts with high immigrant populations where some students may register under 
anglicized names.  For example, a student legally named “Fan” may decide to sign up for the 
SRP using the name “Sam”.  Because these names are phonetically unrelated it may be 
impossible to match this student’s district record with his Participation record.  It is possible to 
circumvent this problem by using additional information such as grade, date of birth, and last 
name, but even with this additional information, students are often unmatchable. 
To reduce the amount of time needed to match Spring and Participation files, we utilized 
a user-written command in Stata called “matchit” (from Julio Raffo).  Matchit measures the 
distance between two text strings and produces a similarity score for the pairing.  If two text 
strings match exactly then the similarity score is equal to 1, and all other matches result in a 
similarity score less than 1.  Exact matches were automatically kept, and all other potential 
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matches were considered individually.  Once Spring and Participation were matched, the 
resulting dataset was then matched to Fall.  This part of the matching process was 
straightforward in that Spring and Fall datasets contained numeric identifiers upon which we 
could connect student records from one semester to another. 
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Appendix D:  Duplicate Student Observations with Mismatched Outcome Data 
 
Once Spring and Participation are matched, the resulting dataset is matched to Fall.  The 
matching process is straightforward in that Spring and Fall datasets contain numeric identifiers 
upon which we can connect student records from one semester to another.   
One thing to be aware of during this stage of the data preparation is that students, who 
should appear only once in the fully matched set, sometimes appear more than once.  This 
happens occasionally when students move from one district to another, so student information 
may exist in both the previous district as well as the current district.  For example, a student lives 
in District A and takes the District A assessment.  During that same spring, the student moves 
into District B, and District B uses a different assessment than District A.  District B has the 
student take their assessment during that same spring.  During the fall, the student moves to 
District C.  In the fully matched dataset, the student will have two records.  One record will be 
District A in the Spring with District C in the fall, and the other will be District B in the spring 
and District C in the fall.  We have no reason to conclude that one record is more correct than the 
other, but each student may only appear in the analytic sample once.  Which observation pair do 
we choose?  If we decide to always choose the observation pair with the higher spring score, or 
likewise with the lower spring score, then we may introduce bias into our estimate of the effect 
of SRP on student achievement.  Although we do not observe this phenomenon very often, it is 
still important to avoid introducing bias if possible, so we randomly select one observation for 
students with more than one record. 
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Chapter 3: The Equal Rights Amendment and Labor Market Outcomes for Women 
Introduction 
The United States Constitution does not expressly guarantee equal rights based on 
gender.  The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was proposed by the National Women’s Party in 
order to remedy this situation.  Although the ERA failed its ratification attempt in 1982, the 
adoption of a completely unrelated amendment has renewed ratification hopes for ERA 
supporters.    This paper examines whether the ERA had an effect on the labor outcomes of 
women in treated states relative to men and women in control states. 
Section 1 of the ERA reads: 
“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of sex (Mansbridge, 
1986, p. 1).” 
Background 
Although amendments to the U.S. Constitution may be adopted through one of two 
methods, only one of these methods has ever been used.  This particular method requires that a 
proposed amendment pass in both the House and Senate with at least two-thirds of the votes.  If 
this occurs, the issue is turned over to the states (Archives, August 25, 2013).  Typically, states 
are then given seven years in which to ratify the proposed amendment.  An extension can be 
granted, such as in the case of the ERA, moving this deadline to a total of ten years (Kyvig, 
1996).  If three-fourths of the states4 ratify, then the amendment becomes part of the 
                                                          
4 More specifically, this is ¾ of the states in the union at the time of ratification. 
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Constitution, otherwise the ratification process expires at the deadline (Kyvig, 1996; 
Mansbridge, 1986).   
The ERA’s bid to become an amendment followed a typical course.  It was introduced in 
Congress for the first time in 1923.  And although it was reintroduced at every subsequent 
congressional session, it was 1972 before it finally gained approval in both the House and 
Senate.  The future looked promising for ERA supporters as many states rushed to ratify it.  In 
fact, the ratification process in Hawaii began within minutes of the congressional vote and 
resulted in unanimous approval in both the Hawaiian house and senate (Mansbridge, 1986).  By 
the end of 1972, 22 of the 32 state legislatures in session had ratified the ERA.  With six years 
left to go, ratification of the ERA needed the approval of only 16 more states. 
Much to the dismay of ERA activists, support for the amendment soon began to whither.  
When the seven-year deadline rolled around in 1979, only 35 of the necessary 38 states had 
passed the ERA.  Congress extended the deadline to 1982, but it made no difference.  The ERA 
expired with no additional states passing (Crowley, 2006). 5 
Since the ERA died in 1982, it is reasonable to wonder how it is relevant for discussion 
today.  The reason is twofold.  The first can be explained by the ratification story of the 27th 
Amendment and the second can be explained by the Constitution. 
Motivation 
The 27th Amendment is sometimes referred to as the “Madison Amendment” because it 
was one of twelve amendments proposed by James Madison in the late 1700’s.  Ten of 
Madison’s twelve became our Bill of Rights.  As of 1982, only eight states had passed the 
                                                          
5 Idaho, Nebraska, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Kentucky rescinded the ERA by the end of 1979 but still counted 
towards the total of thirty-five (Crowley, 2006b). 
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Madison Amendment.  Due to the attention brought to it by a University of Texas student, 203 
years after it was first proposed, the Madison Amendment was ratified as our 27th Amendment 
(Bernstein, 1992).  
Many ERA supporters believe that if the Madison Amendment could be passed 200 years 
after its introduction, it could also happen for the ERA (Denning & Vile, 2000).  Whether or not 
this claim is valid is outside the scope of this paper, but what does matter is that people are still 
advocating the ratification of the ERA.  Since the ERA has been around since the 1920’s, 
considerable time and money have been invested in its ratification over the years.  In fact, in the 
last two years, the ERA failed in three states, Arizona, Florida, and Virginia, and passed in two 
others, Nevada and Illinois, bringing the total numbers of states passing to 37 states.  One 
question that may be asked is whether the ratification process rather than actual ratification 
induces changes in the states.       
Another reason to study the effects of equal rights legislation and the possibility of 
making that legislation part of the U.S. Constitution is that currently our Constitution does not 
explicitly prohibit discrimination based on gender.  Although some argue that the Equal 
Protection clause of the 14th Amendment does just that, it was 1971, more than a hundred years 
after it became an amendment, that the Supreme Court really interpreted it that way 
(Mansbridge, 1986).  When the ERA was introduced in the 1920’s it was intended to remedy this 
constitutional omission.   
   Although ERA supporters suggest otherwise, it was never really intended to have short 
run effects.  This is because the ERA only guaranteed equality “under the law” and laws at the 
time the ERA was originally proposed were not overtly discriminatory towards women 
(Mansbridge, 1986).  The ERA would have needed to prohibit discriminatory behavior rather 
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than just discriminatory laws.  Additionally, the ERA applied only to discrimination “by the 
United States or by any State” rather than to all employers and so therefore excluded non-
government employers.  The ERA was intended to induce long term change by providing 
justification for the Supreme Court to rule on future cases with an eye towards gender equality 
(Mansbridge, 1986).   
However, just because the ERA wasn’t intended to have short run consequences, doesn’t 
mean that it did not.  In fact, Crowley (2006) finds that more women living in states that had 
passed and retained the ERA ran for and were elected to political office compared to women in 
non-passing or rescinding states.  The result is that legislative bodies in ERA states were more 
likely to surpass a threshold of being at least 15 percent female.  This percentage is important 
because research indicates that it is the threshold beyond which women are more effective and 
influential in the workplace (Kanter, 1977).  Specific to the political arena, Cammisa and 
Reingold (2004) and Studlar and McAllister (2002) find that the marginal effect of an additional 
female legislator depends on the number of existing female legislators in a state.  Crowley 
concludes that the ERA campaigns educated women politically, and for many, made politics 
personal for the first time.  Additionally, she suggests that the ideology behind the ERA acted as 
a symbol of power that prompted women to challenge their traditional roles in society.  
One aspect of women’s traditional roles in society is their involvement, or lack thereof, in 
the labor market.  This can be examined in two ways.  First, we can observe if characteristics of 
the labor market, in particular those that cannot be controlled by an individual, change for 
women.  Did the probability of employment improve for women?  Did they work more hours or 
have higher salary?  Second, we can observe how characteristics that individual women can 
control, such as labor force participation, changed with ERA enactment.  Some women have a 
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great level of freedom in making decisions that determine their participation or success in the 
labor market.  In particular, the determinants of married women’s labor market decisions may 
differ from those of unmarried women.  Because of this we examine the ERA’s effects on labor 
market outcomes of women by looking at two sets of comparison groups:  women compared to 
men and married women compared to unmarried women. 
Equal Rights Legislation 
In the 1960’s, the U.S. was experiencing many changes especially regarding race and sex 
discrimination legislation.  Two examples of this are the Equal Pay Act of 1963 which mandated 
equal pay for equal work and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibited 
discrimination in terms of hiring, firing, and pay (Neumark & Stock, 2006). 
In the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, laws were passed that limited women’s employment.  
These limits involved restricting industries and occupations, times of day, and the maximum 
number of hours women could work.  The strength of the influence that these laws had on 
women’s labor force participation by the mid 1900’s is uncertain.  But in the mid to late 1960’s 
many states made it clear that these laws violated the terms of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
making it “so that such laws were by and large nonbinding by 1970 (Neumark & Stock, 2006, p. 
39).”   
In order to identify the causal effects of policy changes, researchers require some 
variability across the sample.  This variability allows for appropriate determination of 
observations that are affected by the policy change, the treatment group, and observations that 
are not affected by the policy change, the control group.  State level legislation, as opposed to 
federal legislation, provides this necessary variability and thus the ability to identify causal 
effects of legislation (Neumark & Stock, 2006).   
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To avoid the influence of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 while gaining the desirable variability for identification purposes, Neumark and Stock 
(2006) examine the effects of similar state level laws that were enacted prior to 1960.  The sex 
discrimination laws prevalent during this period, known as Equal Pay Laws (EPL), did not tackle 
the problems of discrimination in hiring and firing, but instead focused on equal pay for equal 
work.  They examine the effects of this legislation on two labor market outcomes: employment 
and earnings.  Their findings suggest that EPLs cause a decrease in the employment rate and an 
initial decrease in earnings followed by a slow increase over time for women relative to men. 
Data 
Sample selection 
In order to determine the effect of the Equal Rights Amendment on labor market 
outcomes for women, we use individual level data from the 1970-2012 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) March Supplement.  Data were limited to 2012 in attempt to avoid the influence of 
current ERA passage.  We restrict the sample to individuals 20-65 years of age who live in 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs).  Additionally, we drop those who are in the 
armed forces, those who work for no pay, self-employed workers, and those for whom state of 
residence cannot be uniquely determined.6  This sample selection method applies to all analyses.  
Additional restrictions that are specific to the analysis of a particular dependent variable are 
described in the corresponding section. 
                                                          
6 Prior to 1977, the CPS codes certain states into groups while others are coded individually. 
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Variables 
Dependent  
We examine the following labor market outcomes:  labor force participation (LFP), 
employment (EMPL), hours worked (HRSWK), and salary (LNWKRSAL).   
LFPi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i is either employed, not employed and 
looking for work, or not employed and on layoff.  The sample used for the LFP analysis is as 
described above.  EMPLi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i is employed.  We used 
the CPS employment status variable to define employment.  The EMPL analysis used the 
additional sample restriction that for all i, individual i is in the labor force (i.e. LFPi = 1).  
HRSWKi is equal to the number of hours that individual i reports having worked.  The CPS 
variable for hours worked last week is used for our measure.  The HRSWK analysis uses the 
additional sample restriction that for all i, individual i is employed (i.e. EMPLi = 1).  Salaryi is 
defined using the CPS variable for wage income last year.  In order to use real rather than 
nominal values, we adjusted wage income using the personal consumption expenditure deflator 
(PCE).  Next, we divided real wages by the number of weeks worked last year.  If weeks worked 
is equal to zero or missing, then weekly real wages is set to missing.  Finally, we add one to 
weekly real wages and take a log transformation.7  The resulting unit of measurement is log 2005 
dollars.  The Salary analysis uses the additional sample restriction that for all i, individual i is a 
fulltime, full year worker (i.e. Fulltimei = 1).  Fulltimei is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
individual i worked thirty-five hours per week or more for at least forty-six weeks last year. 
                                                          
7 For all i, real hourly income is greater than or equal to 0.  Because log(0)= -∞, we add one to each value of real hourly income 
so that the resulting log transformation will remain greater than or equal to zero.  
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Independent Variables 
We use various explanatory variables to explore these four labor market outcomes.  ERAi 
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for any individual i who resides in a state during a year for 
which the ERA is active and 0 otherwise.  ERAi is used to generate our variable of interest, an 
interaction between the ERA variable, as described above, and a dummy variable indicating that 
the individual is female.  State ERA enactment data was coded based on Crowley (2006).     
Other Legislation 
Since the goal of these analyses is to identify the causal effect of the ERA on labor 
market outcomes, it is important to control for other forces that may affect those same outcomes.  
For example, in the late 1960’s and 70’s many states passed unilateral divorce laws.  Before 
these laws were passed, states required both spouses to mutually agree to a divorce.  Once these 
laws passed, divorce could be granted based on the desire of only one spouse.  While unilateral 
divorce laws were good in that an individual no longer needed to have a like-minded spouse to 
get a divorce, it also created an environment of financial uncertainty for married individuals.  
This may have been particularly worrisome for married women who were less likely to have 
their own income.  Under mutual divorce laws, married women knew that they could depend on 
having access to their spouses’ incomes.   
 Friedberg (1998) estimates that the divorce rate would have been six percent lower if 
states had kept mutual divorce laws.  As the divorce rate increases, more married women may 
find themselves facing financial situations that necessitate entry into the labor force.  Increased 
labor force participation among married women may change the composition of the labor force 
and potentially the likelihood of becoming employed, the number of hours worked, and salary.  
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For each of the four labor market outcomes, we include a model that includes a time and state 
varying dummy variable that controls for the passage of unilateral divorce laws. 
Unilateral divorce data was coded based on Friedberg (1998).  Equal Pay Law data, as 
previously discussed, was coded based on Neumark and Stock (2006).   
A note on the EPL variable:  Since EPLs were passed before the earliest survey year in 
the dataset, the dummy variables are not time varying.  Instead, they are effectively dummy 
variables controlling for a particular group of states.  States that passed EPLs may differ in some 
otherwise unobservable way from states that did not pass EPLs.  Seven states passed Equal Pay 
Laws and not the ERA: Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, Nevada, and Oklahoma.  
Eight states passed the ERA but did not pass EPLs:  Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, New Mexico, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin.  Twenty-seven states passed both.  Any significant 
results arising from the inclusion of the EPL variable should not be interpreted as effects 
generated by EPLs but rather a common trend in states that committed themselves via early 
legislation to a reduction in sex discrimination. 
Other Controls 
Another consideration is that what looks like a reaction to the ERA may actually be a 
result of changes in male employment.  In other words, families may choose to substitute the 
supply of female labor for male labor— meaning women may increase employment while men 
decrease employment.  We account for this by including a control for the male unemployment 
rate in the third specification for each dependent variable and comparison group.   
In addition to the variables described above, the various regressions also include controls 
for age and aged squared and dummy variables for gender, race, highest level of education, 
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parental status, state and year.  Finally, three variables are created to measure each of the first 
three years leading up to passage of the proposed amendment for each year.  The first lead refers 
to one year prior to the passage of the amendment, the second lead refers to two years prior, and 
so on. 
Table 1 contains weighted means and standard errors for the explanatory variables 
previously described.  State and year dummy variables have been omitted due to space 
considerations.  These descriptive statistics are based on the LFP analytic sample. 
Model 
Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation is ideal for assessing the effects of policy 
changes that influence one group of individuals, the treatment group, but not another, the control 
group.  For this study, our treatment group consisted of females in states with an active ERA law.   
One requirement for appropriate DID estimation is that in the absence of the policy 
change, the treatment and control groups should exhibit similar trends in terms of the outcome 
under consideration.  Several characteristics of the labor market during this time raise some 
concerns about satisfying this assumption.  First, as indicated previously, racial discrimination 
legislation was passed just prior to the ERA.  Second, at certain points in history black women 
differ from white women in terms of labor force participation rates (Blau, Ferber, & Winkler, 
2002).  And finally, previous research supports the idea that black women are governed by a 
different selection mechanism than white women in regard to labor force participation (Neal, 
2002).  Together this evidence suggests that treatment and control groups may differ in terms of 
racial composition and those differences may bias our estimates of the ERA legislation.  To try 
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to control for this potential problem, in one of the specifications we included an interaction term 
allowing the effect of the ERA on white women to vary compared to women of other races.  
Additionally, we further restrict the sample to observations in Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (SMSA) only.  This decision was made for two reasons.  First, ERA 
mobilization efforts would have been more concentrated in areas with greatly population density.  
Exposure to these efforts may have influenced the behavior or decision-making processes of 
women in SMSAs in ways that rural women were not influenced.  Second, survey statistics from 
the time that the ERA was passed indicate that individuals from urban areas were more pro-ERA 
as compared to rural residents (Mansbridge, 1986).    
Yij measured the outcomes of labor force participation (Yi1), employment (Yi2), hours 
worked (Yi3), and salary (Yi4).  For each of these dependent variables, we started with the basic 
model and then provided four additional specifications on that model.  For all specifications and 
models, we control for state (Si) and year (Tt) fixed effects.  Because the error terms may be 
correlated within a given state, we cluster on state of residence. 
The basic specification was of the form represented by Equation 1: 
Yij  = β0 + β1 (ERAit x Femalei) + β2 Femalei + β3 ERAit + β4 Tt + β5 Si + ui (1) 
The variable of interest is ERAit x Femalei.  This variable estimated the effect of ERA on 
women in states with active ERA legislation.  Specifications 2-5 are of the form represented by 
Equation 2: 
Yij  = β0 + β1 (ERAit x Female) + β2 Femalei + β3 ERAit + β4 Tt + β5 Si +  β6 Xi + ui                                      
(2) 
In specification 2, Xi was a vector of demographic control variables that included age, 
age-squared, and dummy variables for race, educational attainment, parental status, and marital 
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status.  Specification 3 added to 2 by including dummy variables that controlled for Equal Pay 
Laws, unilateral divorce legislation, and a set control for the years leading up to ERA passage in 
a given state. Specification 4 included a variable to control for the male unemployment rate.  
And finally, Specification 5 included an interaction term allowing the effect of ERA to vary for 
white women.    
Results 
In Table 3- Table 6 we present the regression results for our various models.  In each 
table, columns 1-5 represent the specifications for each dependent variable, as described above.  
Each table and column contain the results of regressions that define men as the control group and 
women as the treatment group.  Thus, these results are intended to gauge the effect of ERA 
passage on the gender gap.  The variable of interest for each of these columns is Female*ERA.  
Column 5 also contains White*Female*ERA as a secondary variable of interest.   
LFP 
Labor Force Participation results may be seen in Table 2.  In all specifications, the ERA 
passage variable is associated with statistically significant increases in labor force participation.  
However, looking at the female interaction term with ERA, regardless of the specification, we 
found no statistically significant results.  The most basic specification, column 1, we found that 
the estimated effect of ERA passage increased the expected probability of labor force 
participation of women by approximately .6 (p = .510) percentage points relative to men, 
however, this result is not statistically significant.  When we controlled for demographic 
characteristics of individuals, the estimate rose to .9 (p = .397) percentage points but remained 
insignificant. Adding controls for EPLs, unilateral divorce law changes, and the years leading up 
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to ERA passage, the estimate fell slightly to approximately .8 (p = .608, p = .608) percentage 
points and was consistent regardless of whether we included a control for male unemployment 
rates.  Again, these estimates were not significantly different than zero.  In Column 5, although 
the estimated coefficient for the Female-ERA interaction term fell to -1.9 (p = .266) percentage 
points, allowing the effect of ERA passage to vary by race, resulted in an estimate of 3.6 (p = 
.005) percentage point increase for white women.  These Female-ERA interaction term is 
statistically insignificant and the White-Female-ERA interaction is significant at the 1% level.  
This makes sense if women of non-white racial classifications already had higher levels of labor 
force participation before ERA passage.  Furthermore, for white women, these results agree with 
the intuition that if wages are expected to increase in the labor market due to equal rights 
legislation, the opportunity cost of not working increases.   
Employment 
Employment results may be seen in Table 3.  In the basic employment specification, 
Column 1, we find that the ERA increases the likelihood of becoming employed for women 
relative to men by approximately .3 (p = .014) percentage points.  Including demographic 
characteristics of individuals in the sample causes the estimate to drop slightly to .2 (p = .037) 
percentage points.  Columns 1 and 2 results are significant at the 5% level.  The additional 
controls in the expanded models, Columns 3-5, cause the results to drop only slightly to as low 
as .1 percent points, but the statistically significance of the results completely disappears (p = 
.167, p = .179, p = .592).  In opposition to the LFP results, ERA effects on white women do not 
deviate from that of other racial classifications (p = .684).   
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Hours worked 
Hours Worked results may be seen in Table 4.  Estimates of the ERA effect of women are 
insignificant in specifications 1-4 (p = .375, p = .398, p = .518, p = .512).  The only statistically 
significant result is found in the full specification in Column 5.  Although it is only significant at 
the 10 percent level, the estimates in Column 5 suggest that women in ERA enactment states 
worked .43 hours (p = .071) longer than men per week after the enactment.  In this column, the 
variable that allows ERA effects to vary for women of different races, indicates that white 
women actually dropped the number of hours they worked relative to men by approximately .70 
hours (p = .013).  Although this result is significant at the 5% level, combining the estimated 
coefficients yields an estimated decrease of .26 (p = .409) hours for white women.  This result is 
not statistically significant.  In total, this means that non-white women worked more hours 
relative to men after the passage of ERA, and white women did not.  This result is consistent 
with white women increasing labor force participation but not being more likely to be employed. 
Salary 
Salary results may be seen in Table 5.  The salary regressions imply that the ERA did not 
reduce the gender gap in pay.  Estimates for the first four specifications found no statistical 
evidence that women’s salaries improved as a result of ERA enactment (p = .411, p = .208, p = 
.367, p = .364).  The full specification found in Column 5 shows an increase in real hourly 
salaries for women of 4.4 percent (p = .002).  This result is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.  Unfortunately for white women, the estimate that allows the effects of ERA to 
vary across races indicates that white women actually see a drop in hourly salary that equates to 
approximately 3.8 percent (p = .000).  Together these coefficients sum to a .5 (p = .621) 
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percentage point increase in white women’s wages, however the estimate is not statistically 
significant.  This suggests that non-white women saw an increase in salary as a result of ERA 
passage, but white women did not.       
Conclusion 
Economic research on the effects of the Equal Rights Amendment is sparse. This study 
focuses on labor market outcomes such as labor force participation, employment, hours worked, 
and salary for women in states where the ERA was passed.  We find that the Equal Rights 
Amendment increased the likelihood of labor force participation for white women but did little to 
increase the likelihood of employment for women generally.  Non-white women saw slight 
increases in the average numbers of hours worked per week relative to men and experienced a  
decrease in the gender gap in pay. 
The expected increase in the likelihood of labor force participation for white women is 
sizeable after controlling for other policies that may influence labor force participation, namely 
unilateral divorce laws, Equal Pay Laws, and male unemployment.  And although the ERA was 
not expected to reduce the size of the gender gap, it appears to have done just that, at least for 
non-white women.  Overall, white women were attracted to the labor market, but non-white 
women reaped the benefits of increased pay and hours of work. 
With so little research focusing on the Equal Rights Amendment, there are endless 
possibilities for future direction.  Alternative segments of the population may react to policies 
such as the Equal Rights Amendment in completely different ways.  Some examples might be 
women with young children or women living in rural communities.  Understanding this behavior 
can be helpful in making better legislative decisions.  Also, the ERA’s effects on hours worked 
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and salary should be looked at more closely.  Women working in male-dominated fields may 
differ in terms of labor market outcomes when compared to women in female-dominated fields.  
Enactment of laws such as the ERA can go a long way towards eliminating male to female pay 
differential, but it is imperative that researchers make a concerted effort to understand likely 
labor market reactions to such a policy. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics by gender 
 
Male Female 
LFP Rate 0.85 0.66 
Employment rate 0.87 0.70 
Hours Worked 36.27 25.28 
Log Weekly Real Salary 6.48 6.00 
Fulltime Worker 0.67 0.42 
Age 39.43 40.04 
Parent 0.39 0.46 
Educational Attainment: Less than High 
School 0.17 0.16 
Educational Attainment: High School 0.46 0.49 
Educational Attainment: Associate 0.11 0.11 
Educational Attainment: Bachelor 0.18 0.17 
Educational Attainment: Master 0.09 0.07 
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Table 2: LFP regression estimates 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ERA 0.0469*** 0.0272*** 0.0342** 0.0345** 0.0335** 
 (0.00970) (0.00902) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0127) 
Female * ERA 0.00684 0.00905 0.00849 0.00849 -0.0186 
 (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0166) 
Female -0.196*** -0.191*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.163*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0291) (0.0291) (0.0299) 
White*Female*ERA     0.0362*** 
     (0.0123) 
White* Female     -0.116*** 
     (0.00965) 
White  0.0279*** 0.0279*** 0.0278*** 0.0783*** 
  (0.00510) (0.00513) (0.00514) (0.00529) 
Married  -0.0133*** -0.0135*** -0.0136*** -0.0118*** 
  (0.00359) (0.00353) (0.00352) (0.00362) 
Age  0.0427*** 0.0427*** 0.0427*** 0.0427*** 
  (0.000446) (0.000451) (0.000451) (0.000450) 
Age2  -0.000577*** -0.000577*** -0.000577*** -0.000577*** 
  (4.91e-06) (4.91e-06) (4.91e-06) (4.91e-06) 
Parent  -0.0507*** -0.0509*** -0.0509*** -0.0528*** 
  (0.00339) (0.00337) (0.00338) (0.00342) 
Educ < HS  -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.179*** -0.179*** 
  (0.00476) (0.00477) (0.00479) (0.00465) 
99 
 
Educ = HS  -0.0546*** -0.0543*** -0.0544*** -0.0537*** 
  (0.00249) (0.00257) (0.00255) (0.00256) 
Educ = Assoc  -0.0167*** -0.0168*** -0.0168*** -0.0166*** 
  (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00146) 
Educ = Mast  0.0426*** 0.0429*** 0.0430*** 0.0429*** 
  (0.00150) (0.00152) (0.00151) (0.00150) 
Div Law   -0.0392** -0.0388** -0.0398** 
   (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0170) 
Female * Div Law   0.0837*** 0.0837*** 0.0847*** 
   (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0291) 
Lead1   0.0246** 0.0245** 0.0252** 
   (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0107) 
Lead2   0.0255*** 0.0255*** 0.0264*** 
   (0.00869) (0.00856) (0.00859) 
Lead3   0.00628 0.00402 0.00479 
   (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0105) 
EPL   -0.0164 -0.0164 -0.0179 
   (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0112) 
Female * EPL   -0.0108 -0.0107 -0.00789 
   (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0193) 
Male Unemployment    -0.00181*** -0.00180*** 
    (0.000374) (0.000368) 
Constant 0.854*** 0.223*** 0.247*** 0.258*** 0.218*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0243) (0.0246) (0.0235) 
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Observations 2,761,150 2,737,971 2,737,971 2,737,971 2,737,971 
R-squared 0.055 0.140 0.142 0.142 0.143 
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Table 3: Employment Regression Estimates 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ERA 0.00296 -4.06e-05 0.00453** 0.00535*** 0.00528*** 
 (0.00294) (0.00241) (0.00197) (0.00156) (0.00155) 
Female * ERA 0.00315** 0.00271** 0.00238 0.00232 0.00147 
 (0.00123) (0.00127) (0.00170) (0.00170) (0.00273) 
Female -0.0149*** -0.0139*** -0.0193*** -0.0193*** -0.0109*** 
 (0.000931) (0.000874) (0.00303) (0.00302) (0.00353) 
White*Female*ERA     0.00140 
     (0.00341) 
White* Female     -0.0108*** 
     (0.00215) 
White  0.0239*** 0.0238*** 0.0235*** 0.0285*** 
  (0.00177) (0.00177) (0.00177) (0.00195) 
Married  0.0150*** 0.0149*** 0.0147*** 0.0148*** 
  (0.000673) (0.000669) (0.000674) (0.000678) 
Age  0.00482*** 0.00483*** 0.00472*** 0.00472*** 
  (0.000266) (0.000266) (0.000268) (0.000267) 
Age2  -5.17e-05*** -5.18e-05*** -5.02e-05*** -5.03e-05*** 
  (2.99e-06) (3.00e-06) (3.02e-06) (3.01e-06) 
Parent  -0.0105*** -0.0106*** -0.0105*** -0.0108*** 
  (0.000449) (0.000446) (0.000459) (0.000462) 
Educ < HS  -0.0414*** -0.0415*** -0.0420*** -0.0420*** 
  (0.00114) (0.00115) (0.00113) (0.00114) 
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Educ = HS  -0.0122*** -0.0122*** -0.0125*** -0.0125*** 
  (0.000690) (0.000690) (0.000685) (0.000685) 
Educ = Assoc  -0.00335*** -0.00338*** -0.00340*** -0.00338*** 
  (0.000422) (0.000423) (0.000415) (0.000418) 
Educ = Mast  0.00126** 0.00130*** 0.00147*** 0.00151*** 
  (0.000474) (0.000465) (0.000475) (0.000479) 
Div Law   -0.00538** -0.00444** -0.00452** 
   (0.00210) (0.00192) (0.00187) 
Female * Div Law   0.00657** 0.00657** 0.00678** 
   (0.00320) (0.00319) (0.00302) 
Lead1   0.00542* 0.00514* 0.00515* 
   (0.00290) (0.00275) (0.00277) 
Lead2   0.00327 0.00333 0.00338 
   (0.00251) (0.00231) (0.00233) 
Lead3   0.00844*** 0.00303 0.00301 
   (0.00251) (0.00206) (0.00207) 
EPL   -0.00308** -0.00281** -0.00290** 
   (0.00132) (0.00112) (0.00109) 
Female * EPL   -4.02e-06 5.02e-05 0.000275 
   (0.00223) (0.00223) (0.00222) 
Male Unemployment    -0.00431*** -0.00431*** 
    (0.000245) (0.000245) 
Constant 0.975*** 0.859*** 0.862*** 0.890*** 0.886*** 
 (0.00432) (0.00586) (0.00565) (0.00590) (0.00609) 
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Observations 2,074,418 2,056,122 2,056,122 2,056,122 2,056,122 
R-squared 0.002 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.019 
 
  
104 
 
Table 4: Hours of Work Regression Estimates 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ERA 1.097** 0.699* -0.216 -0.186 -0.209 
 (0.433) (0.413) (0.338) (0.353) (0.355) 
Female * ERA -0.258 -0.242 -0.198 -0.201 0.433* 
 (0.288) (0.284) (0.304) (0.304) (0.235) 
Female -4.987*** -4.968*** -5.374*** -5.373*** -3.533*** 
 (0.165) (0.169) (0.362) (0.362) (0.308) 
White*Female*ERA     -0.695** 
     (0.271) 
White* Female     -2.376*** 
     (0.195) 
White  0.494*** 0.507*** 0.499*** 1.892*** 
  (0.103) (0.102) (0.102) (0.0839) 
Married  0.340*** 0.346*** 0.339*** 0.374*** 
  (0.0427) (0.0435) (0.0434) (0.0390) 
Age  0.899*** 0.897*** 0.893*** 0.893*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0105) 
Age2  -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0104*** -0.0104*** 
  (0.000110) (0.000109) (0.000109) (0.000111) 
Parent  -0.938*** -0.936*** -0.935*** -0.990*** 
  (0.0795) (0.0788) (0.0789) (0.0836) 
Educ < HS  -2.423*** -2.405*** -2.425*** -2.414*** 
  (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) 
105 
 
Educ = HS  -1.368*** -1.364*** -1.378*** -1.357*** 
  (0.0426) (0.0423) (0.0420) (0.0415) 
Educ = Assoc  -1.311*** -1.305*** -1.305*** -1.298*** 
  (0.0422) (0.0413) (0.0413) (0.0416) 
Educ = Mast  2.011*** 2.012*** 2.018*** 2.032*** 
  (0.0792) (0.0792) (0.0787) (0.0790) 
Div Law   -0.173 -0.139 -0.157 
   (0.159) (0.164) (0.159) 
Female * Div Law   0.592 0.592 0.664* 
   (0.392) (0.392) (0.333) 
Lead1   -0.813** -0.824** -0.838** 
   (0.357) (0.365) (0.366) 
Lead2   -0.331 -0.329 -0.339 
   (0.401) (0.417) (0.418) 
Lead3   -2.492*** -2.686*** -2.707*** 
   (0.498) (0.540) (0.544) 
EPL   0.533** 0.544** 0.538** 
   (0.208) (0.216) (0.222) 
Female * EPL   -0.178 -0.176 -0.134 
   (0.279) (0.279) (0.260) 
Male Unemployment    -0.156*** -0.156*** 
    (0.0110) (0.0110) 
Constant 41.85*** 25.01*** 25.64*** 26.66*** 25.54*** 
 (0.664) (0.663) (0.441) (0.452) (0.479) 
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Observations 2,004,765 1,987,143 1,987,143 1,987,143 1,987,143 
R-squared 0.068 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.110 
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Table 5: Salary Regression Estimates 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ERA 0.0749*** 0.0276** 0.0382*** 0.0375** 0.0368** 
 (0.0147) (0.0115) (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0143) 
Female * ERA 0.0150 0.0168 0.0112 0.0112 0.0438*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0132) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0137) 
Female -0.272*** -0.258*** -0.286*** -0.286*** -0.229*** 
 (0.0132) (0.00994) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0253) 
White*Female*ERA     -0.0380*** 
     (0.00850) 
White* Female     -0.0741*** 
     (0.0110) 
White  0.0933*** 0.0933*** 0.0935*** 0.139*** 
  (0.00771) (0.00769) (0.00769) (0.0107) 
Married  0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 
  (0.00290) (0.00290) (0.00290) (0.00303) 
Age  0.0519*** 0.0519*** 0.0520*** 0.0520*** 
  (0.000799) (0.000802) (0.000804) (0.000812) 
Age2  -0.000504*** -0.000504*** -0.000506*** -0.000506*** 
  (8.29e-06) (8.34e-06) (8.36e-06) (8.39e-06) 
Parent  0.0331*** 0.0330*** 0.0330*** 0.0308*** 
  (0.00441) (0.00440) (0.00440) (0.00409) 
Educ < HS  -0.636*** -0.637*** -0.636*** -0.635*** 
  (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0245) 
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Educ = HS  -0.348*** -0.348*** -0.348*** -0.347*** 
  (0.00504) (0.00503) (0.00503) (0.00499) 
Educ = Assoc  -0.205*** -0.205*** -0.205*** -0.205*** 
  (0.00396) (0.00393) (0.00392) (0.00389) 
Educ = Mast  0.162*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 
  (0.00467) (0.00466) (0.00464) (0.00470) 
Div Law   -0.0275 -0.0283 -0.0289 
   (0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0212) 
Female * Div Law   0.0245 0.0245 0.0278 
   (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0242) 
Lead1   0.0286 0.0288 0.0281 
   (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0188) 
Lead2   0.0319** 0.0318** 0.0310** 
   (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0137) 
Lead3   -0.0176 -0.0128 -0.0139 
   (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0203) 
EPL   -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.121*** 
   (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0105) 
Female * EPL   0.0157 0.0157 0.0163* 
   (0.00989) (0.00989) (0.00945) 
Male Unemployment    0.00385*** 0.00387*** 
    (0.000702) (0.000697) 
Constant 2.908*** 1.791*** 1.819*** 1.794*** 1.758*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0175) (0.0224) (0.0227) (0.0225) 
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Observations 1,472,263 1,461,201 1,461,201 1,461,201 1,461,201 
R-squared 0.068 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.317 
 
